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In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant [7] studied cost sharing proto-
cols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a
Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open
problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost
sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests. In this work, we focus
on undirected networks and analyze topological properties of the underlying graph so
that an optimal Steiner forest can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium (by some
separable cost sharing protocol) independent of the edge costs. We term a graph
efficient if the above stated property holds. As our main result, we give a complete
characterization of efficient undirected graphs for two-player network design games:
an undirected graph is efficient if and only if it does not contain (at least) one out of
few forbidden subgraphs. Our characterization implies that several graph classes are
efficient: generalized series-parallel graphs, fan and wheel graphs and graphs with
small cycles.
1. Introduction
In the Steiner forest problem, there is a network (G, c) with an undirected graph G = (V,E) and
nonnegative edge costs c(e), e ∈ E. Furthermore, there are n ≥ 1 pairs (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn) of
vertices in G and each such pair (si, ti) needs the vertices si and ti to be connected by (at least
one) path. Thus, a feasible solution for the Steiner forest problem is a subset F ⊆ E so that
each pair (si, ti) is connected in the subgraph induced by F . Since edge costs are nonnegative,
there are no cycles in any optimal solution, thus, one can restrict the search to Steiner forests.
An optimal Steiner forest F is a Steiner forest with minimum cost, that is c(F ) :=
∑
e∈F c(e) is
minimal under all possible Steiner forests F .
1.1. Network Cost Sharing Games
In this article, we consider a game-theoretic variant of the Steiner forest problem (introduced in
Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant [7]) assuming that a system manager can design a protocol that
determines how the edge costs of the forest are shared among its users. Formally, the n pairs
(si, ti) correspond to players N := {1, . . . , n} that each want to establish an (si, ti) connection
with minimum cost. Thus, a strategy profile is a tuple P = (P1, . . . , Pn), where every Pi is an
si-ti path. Given P , the cost of player i using edge e is ξi,e(P ) ≥ 0 and the ξi,e(P )-values are
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determined by a cost-sharing protocol Ξ. The total cost that player i ∈ N needs to pay under
P is defined as
ξi(P ) :=
∑
e∈Pi
ξi,e(P ),
and a pure Nash equilibrium of the strategic game induced by Ξ is a strategy profile P from
which no player can unilaterally deviate, say to another path P ′i , and strictly pay less. Chen
et al. [7] axiomatized cost sharing protocols by the following three fundamental properties (see
also [34, 11]):
1. Budget-balance: The cost c(e) ≥ 0 of each edge e is exactly covered by the collected cost
shares of the players using the edge, that is,
∑
i∈Se(P )
ξi,e(P ) = c(e) for all e ∈ E, where
Se(P ) := {i ∈ N : e ∈ Pi}.
2. Stability : There is at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in each game induced by
the cost sharing protocol.
3. Separability : The cost shares on an edge only depend on the set of players using the edge,
that is, Se(P ) = Se(P ′)⇒ ξi,e(P ) = ξi,e(P ′) for all P,P ′ and e ∈ E.
Budget-balance (Condition 1.) is straightforward, Stability (Condition 2.) requires the existence
of at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (abbreviated PNE). This requirement is
important for applications in which mixed or correlated strategies have no meaningful physical
interpretation (see also the discussion in Osborne and Rubinstein [31, § 3.2]). Separability
(Condition 3.) allows for a distributed implementation of the cost sharing protocol as each
edge needs only to know its own player set. A cost sharing protocol is called separable, if it
satisfies 1.-3.
One important example for a separable cost sharing protocol is the Shapley cost sharing protocol
(see [1, 25]). For the case of two players, the corresponding PoS is known to be 4/3, see Figure 1a
for an example. The solid lines build the unique optimal Steiner forest OPT with cost 3 + 2ε,
but OPT is no PNE since Player 1 has to pay 2 + 2ε > 2 + ε. On the other hand, each player
taking her direct si − ti-edge is the unique PNE with cost 4 + ε.
Can we improve the PoS for this example by using a different separable cost sharing protocol?
Note that for the case of two players, a separable cost sharing protocol is uniquely determined
by one value per edge, namely the amount Player 1 has to pay if both players use this edge. In
Figure 1b we display a cost sharing protocol Ξ for which OPT is a PNE. The edges are labelled
by their costs followed by the value described above which determines Ξ.
s1 = s2 t2
t1
2
1 + 2ε
2 + ε
(a) OPT is no PNE for Shapley
s1 = s2 t2
t1
2|0
1 + 2ε|0
2 + ε|2 + ε
(b) OPT is a PNE for Ξ
Figure 1: Examples for separable cost sharing protocols
1.2. Our Results
We study efficient graphs G = (V,E) having the property that there is an optimal Steiner forest
that can be implemented as a pure Nash equilibrium by some separable cost sharing protocol (we
speak of an enforceable Steiner forest). The above definition does not specify a priori the cost
structure of the graph since any graph can be made efficient by assigning infinite or very high
cost on some edges, thus, deleting “problematic” edges and effectively making the combinatorial
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structure of the graph irrelevant. An equivalent formulation of the research question we study
is the following: what is the largest class of undirected graphs for which the worst-case ratio of
the cost of the best Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal Steiner forest (PoS) is 1? An even
stronger condition is the following: G is said to be strongly efficient, if every optimal Steiner
forest can be enforced as a pure Nash equilibrium.
Our main result gives a complete characterization of efficient and strongly efficient graphs for
two-player games:
Theorem (Main Result (Informal)).
G is efficient ⇔ G is strongly efficient ⇔ G does not contain certain subgraphs (see Figure 3).
Some of the forbidden subgraphs are reminiscent to an instance for directed network design
showing a lower bound of 5/4 for the PoS, see Chen et al. [7]. Our characterization implies that
several well-known graph classes are efficient, while for others, we immediately get counterexam-
ples, see Table 1 for a (non-exhaustive) overview. The proof of the efficiency of the listed graph
classes and the explanation why the other classes contain non-efficient graphs can be found in
Section 5.
efficient classes classes containing non-efficient graphs
generalized series-parallel graphs bipartite graphs
wheel and fan graphs chordal graphs
graphs with longest cycle ≤ 6 planar graphs
Table 1: Efficiency of graph classes
1.3. Used Proof Techniques and Significance
Showing that graphs which contain a forbidden subgraph are not (strongly) efficient is straight-
forward: It suffices to give costs for each forbidden subgraph so that the PoS is greater than 1.
Here, we can effectively delete edges which are not part of a forbidden subgraph by assigning
high costs to them. The property not strongly efficient is derived by proving that the optimal
Steiner forest of the used instance is unique.
The reverse direction, that is, showing that every graph which does not contain a forbidden
subgraph (called bad configuration) is efficient, is much more involved. As a first step we derive
a novel LP-characterization of enforceable Steiner forests. An optimal LP solution (for a given
Steiner forest) corresponds to cost shares that are budget balanced and induce a separable cost
sharing protocol so that the Steiner forest becomes a pure Nash equilibrium. The proof proceeds
now by contraposition: assume we are given a graph without a forbidden subgraph and assume
(by contradiction) that there is an optimal Steiner forest that is not enforceable. We solve the
corresponding LP for the Steiner forest and since the Steiner forest is not enforceable, there
exists an inequality which is not tight and corresponds to an edge that is not completely paid
by the players. We use this unpaid edge to derive the existence of an alternative strategy (path)
for some player with costs equal to a fraction of the currently paid cost shares (this alternative
strategy corresponds to a tight inequality of the LP). These alternative paths are now iteratively
generated until we can either argue that there exists a cheaper Steiner forest compared to the
initial optimal Steiner forest (contradiction), or, there is a bad configuration (contradiction).
Along this main approach, however, several additional ideas are required: the location of the
unpaid edge leads to different subcases for which we need to use special optimal LP-solutions in
order to derive the proper alternative strategies.
We believe that our approach is a promising step towards better understanding the power of
separable cost sharing protocols in general. For the PoS-question in directed or undirected
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graphs, there has been no progress since the initial conference version of Chen et al. [7] roughly
10 years ago. Our characterization and the proof exactly prescribes substructures of a worst-case
instance (namely a bad configuration must exist whose subpaths have costs corresponding to
tight inequalities of an LP solution). We are confident that our proof technique gives a blue-
print for both, characterizing efficient graphs for the general n-Player case, and for resolving the
PoS-question.
1.4. Related Work
For the PoA of uniform cost sharing protocols1, Chen et al. [7] proved (tight) bounds of 2 for
undirected single-sink networks and Θ(polylog(n)) for undirected multi-commodity networks.
For directed single-sink networks the achievable PoA is n. For the PoS, it is shown that single-
sink instances (directed or undirected) admit an optimal Steiner forest as PNE (that is the
PoS is 1). For multi-commodity directed network, the achievable PoS lies in [3/2, log(n)] and
since the initial work of Chen et al. [7], no improvement has been made on this question. For
undirected networks, the only known upper bounds are derived by analyzing the Shapley cost
sharing protocol and they are of order O(log(n)), see Anshelevich et al. [1]. Several works
improved lower and upper bounds for the PoS of Shapley cost sharing in undirected networks
(cf. [3, 2, 10, 12, 14, 29]) but up to day it is open whether the PoS is of order log(n) or
even in O(1). For several special cases, the price of stability is shown to be significantly lower
(cf. [14, 27, 28]). Recently Biló et al. [4] could show that the PoS for broadcast games is O(1).
For the design of separable cost sharing protocols in undirected networks, we are not aware of
any known lower bounds regarding the PoS.
Chen and Roughgarden [6] and Kollias and Roughgarden [25] focused on network design with
weighted players (where Kollias and Roughgarden analyzed this variant as a special case of
weighted congestion games) and derived tight bounds on the PoA for the Shapley cost sharing
protocol. Gkatzelis, Kollias and Roughgarden [18] further showed that the Shapley cost sharing
protocol is optimal among all uniform protocols for polynomial and convex cost functions.2 For
further works analyzing the Shapley protocol or arbitrary cost sharing, see [15, 20, 22, 23, 33, 16].
Harks and von Falkenhausen [21, 34] studied the design of separable cost sharing protocols in
a model, where players want to buy a basis of a matroid. They derived tight bounds for the
achievable PoS and PoA of order log(n) and n, respectively. Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [11]
considered multicast cost sharing games under the assumption that input parameters (such as the
set of terminals and their location in the graph) are not known or only known probabilistically.
Among other results they show constant PoA bounds for outer planar graphs even without
knowing the parameters. On the other hand, they derive strong lower bounds on the PoA of
order log(n) even if the graph metric is known in advance.
Cost sharing approaches for facility location problems and network design problems were ana-
lyzed in [26, 32]. In these works, however, the collected cost shares need not be budget balanced
per edge, thus, leading to a structurally different setting.
There exist several characterizations of efficient graph topologies, albeit for the simpler setting
of average cost sharing (or Shapley cost sharing). Epstein et al. [13] investigated efficient graph
topologies for Shapley cost sharing and showed that for symmetric s-t network congestion games,
only extension parallel graphs (a subclass of series-parallel graphs) are efficient. For asymmetric
(multi-commodity) games, only trees or nodes with parallel edges are efficient. These works are
closely related to Milchtaichs [30] work on the Braess paradox (see also [5, 8, 9]).
1 Uniform protocols require that the cost shares on an edge only depend on the edge cost and the set of players,
but not on the network itself.
2The certificate for optimality uses a characterization of uniform protocols by Gopalakrishnan et al. [19].
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2. An LP-Characterization of Enforceability
Let Pi be the set of simple (si, ti)-paths of G. Furthermore, let F be a fixed Steiner forest and
P = (P1, . . . , Pn) with Pi ∈ Pi the uniquely defined (si, ti)-paths in F . In addition, let Se(P )
be the set of players which use edge e in their (si, ti)-path Pi, i.e. Se(P ) := {i ∈ N : e ∈ Pi}.
An important technical tool for obtaining characterizations of efficient graphs relies on a novel
characterization of Steiner forests F that can actually appear as a pure Nash equilibrium for a
given graph G = (V,E) and given costs c. We define this property formally.
Definition 1. Let (G, c) be an undirected network and N be a set of players with given con-
nectivity constraints. A Steiner forest F ⊆ E is called enforceable, if there is a separable cost
sharing protocol so that P = (P1, . . . , Pn) (where every Pi is the unique path in F ) is a pure
Nash equilibrium of the induced game.
We give a characterization of enforceability of F based on the following linear program LP(F ):
max
∑
i∈N,e∈Pi
ξi,e
s.t.:
∑
i∈Se(P )
ξi,e ≤ c(e) ∀e ∈ F (1)
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i
ξi,e ≤
∑
e∈P ′i\Pi
c(e) ∀P ′i ∈ Pi ∀i ∈ N (2)
ξi,e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Pi ∀i ∈ N (3)
Theorem 1. The Steiner forest F with corresponding strategy profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is en-
forceable if and only if there is an optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi for LP(F ) with∑
i∈Se(P )
ξi,e = c(e) ∀e ∈ F. (BB)
Proof. We first assume that there is an optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi for LP(F ) with (BB).
Consider the following cost sharing protocol, which assigns for each i ∈ N and e ∈ E and each
strategy profile P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n) the following cost shares:
ξi,e(P
′) =

ξi,e, if i ∈ Se(P ′) = Se(P ),
c(e), if i ∈ (Se(P ′) \ Se(P )) and i = min(Se(P ′) \ Se(P )),
c(e), if i ∈ Se(P ′) ⊂ Se(P ) and i = minSe(P ′),
0, else.
It is clear that this protocol fulfills separability and budget-balance. We now show that P is
a pure Nash equilibrium in the game induced by this protocol. For each player i and each
(si, ti)-path P ′i ∈ Pi, we have∑
e∈Pi
ξi,e(P ) =
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i
ξi,e +
∑
e∈Pi∩P ′i
ξi,e ≤
∑
e∈P ′i\Pi
c(e) +
∑
e∈Pi∩P ′i
ξi,e =
∑
e∈P ′i
ξi,e(P
′
i , P−i).
Using standard notation in game theory, P−i denotes the strategy profile (P1, . . . , Pi−1, Pi+1, . . . Pn)
consisting of the strategies of the other players. The inequality follows from condition (2) of the
LP-formulation and the last equality from the definition of the protocol.
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For the other direction, we assume that we have a separable protocol Ξ, so that P is a pure Nash
equilibrium in the induced game. We show that the corresponding cost shares (ξi,e(P ))i∈N,e∈Pi
are an optimal solution for LP(F ) with the desired property (BB).
It is clear that we only have to verify condition (2). Since P is a pure Nash equilibrium and Ξ
is a separable protocol, for each player i ∈ N and each path P ′i ∈ Pi we get∑
e∈Pi
ξi,e(P ) ≤
∑
e∈P ′i
ξi,e(P
′
i , P−i)
⇔
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i
ξi,e(P ) +
∑
e∈Pi∩P ′i
ξi,e(P ) ≤
∑
e∈P ′i\Pi
ξi,e(P
′
i , P−i) +
∑
e∈Pi∩P ′i
ξi,e(P
′
i , P−i)
⇔
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i
ξi,e(P ) ≤
∑
e∈P ′i\Pi
ξi,e(P
′
i , P−i).
Since ξi,e(P ′i , P−i) ≤ c(e) for each edge e ∈ P
′
i , condition (2) follows.
3. A Characterization of Efficient Graphs for Two Player Games
We now consider the case of two players, N = {1, 2}, and first show that an optimal Steiner
forest is not necessarily enforceable. To see this, consider the network displayed in Figure 2. The
solid lines build the unique optimal Steiner forest OPT with cost 22 (which can be easily verified
by considering all 19 possible Steiner forests). But the sum of cost shares that one can collect
by any separable cost sharing protocol is obviously bounded by 9 for Player 1 and 6 + 6 = 12
for Player 2, thus the objective value for LP(OPT) is bounded by 21 < 22 and therefore OPT
is not enforceable. By optimizing the costs for this graph, we get a lower bound of 1514 for the
PoS, see Proposition 2.
s1
s2
t1
t2
5| − |5
3|2|1 2|2|0 3|2|1
4|3|−
5| − |5
9
6 6
Figure 2: OPT is not enforceable (edges of OPT with cost > 0 are labelled with their cost,
followed by an optimal solution ξ1,e|ξ2,e for LP(OPT))
As we will show in the rest of the paper, the configuration displayed in Figure 2 is one of few
cases in which an optimal Steiner forest is not enforceable. Before we can state this as a theorem,
we need a few definitions.
Definition 2 ((Strongly) Efficient Graph).
1. We call (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) efficient, if, for every cost function c, there is an optimal Steiner
forest of (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2), c) which is enforceable (that means the PoS is 1).
2. We call (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) strongly efficient, if, for every cost function c, every optimal
Steiner forest of (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2), c) is enforceable.
6
Definition 3. We call a subgraph H of (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) a Bad Configuration (BC), if H is
one of the graphs in the set BC, where
BC = {BC1a, BC1b, BC2a, BC2b, BC2c, BC2d, BC3, BC4a, BC4b}.
The graphs of BC are displayed in Figure 3 (see Definition 7 for the exact definition), where one
should note the following:
• u, v are the terminal nodes of one player and w, x the terminal nodes of the other player;
• lines represent simple paths and paths are node-disjoint (except for endnodes);
• solid paths have to consist of at least one edge, whereas dashed paths can consist of only
one node.
u
w
v
x
BC1a
u
w
v
x
BC1b
u
w
v
x
BC2a
u
w
v
x
BC2b
u
w
v
x
BC2c (BC2d is the variant which arises from BC2c in
the same way than BC2b from BC2a)
u
w
v
x
BC3
u
w
v
x
BC4a
u
w
v
x
BC4b
Figure 3: Bad Configurations
Theorem 2 (Main Theorem). The following three statements are equivalent:
(1) (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) does not contain a subgraph which is a Bad Configuration.
(2) (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) is efficient.
(3) (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) is strongly efficient.
It is clear that (3) implies (2); a sketch of the proof of (2) ⇒ (1) and (1)⇒ (3) can be found in
the next section.
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4. Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 2
4.1. (2) implies (1)
We assume that (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) contains a Bad Configuration. Then we define a cost func-
tion c so that the optimal Steiner forest is unique and not enforceable, showing the claim. To
this end we choose a subgraph of G that is a BC and set c(e) =∞ if the edge e is not contained
in this subgraph. We now have to distinguish between the different types of BCs. For BC1a, the
costs displayed in Figure 2 carry over (if a path consists of more than one edge, choose the costs
of the corresponding edges arbitrarily so that they sum up to the displayed cost on the path; all
paths with nonzero costs contain at least one edge because of the definition of the corresponding
type of BC). Costs for the other types of BCs can be found in Subsection A.1.
4.2. (1) implies (3)
Consider an arbitrary optimal Steiner forest F (w.r.t. an arbitrary cost function c) and an
optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi of the corresponding LP(F ). Assume that condition (BB) is not
satisfied, i.e. there is an edge that is not paid completely.
Note that P1∩P2 has to contain at least one edge, since otherwise F is enforceable. Furthermore,
P1 ∩ P2 has to be a simple path, since F contains no cycles. We refer to the edges of P1 ∩P2 as
the commonly used edges or the middle part (cf. Figure 4). Note that we can w.l.o.g. assume
that s1 and s2 are in the left part, otherwise we can just swap source and sink since the graph
is undirected. Figure 4 also illustrates the complete ordering on the edges of F that we use
throughout the proof (the numbers indicate in which order we consider the subpaths; the arrows
indicate increasing order within the subpaths).
s1
s2
t1
t2
left part middle part right part
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Figure 4: Left, middle and right part of F ; complete ordering on edges of F
Definition 4. We call an optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi for LP(F ) pushed to the left (PL), if the
following changes of the cost shares (which we denote a push operation) do not yield a feasible
solution for LP(F ) (for every choice of i, e, f and ε > 0):
Increase the cost share ξi,e of Player i on edge e by ε and simultaneously
decrease ξi,f by ε, where f is an edge with higher order than e.
To obtain PL-cost shares (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi , we can use Algorithm PushLeft (see Subsection A.2).
Let e be the first edge (with respect to the order) which is not completely paid according to the
computed PL-cost shares. We distinguish between the cases that e is in the left part of F (Case
L), the middle part of F (Case M) or the right part of F (Case R). In each of these cases, we
get a contradiction (see Proposition 3, Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 for complete proofs).
We now describe some of the main ideas for the Cases L, M and R. If e ∈ Pi, Player i needs to
have a tight alternative q for e (corresponding to a tight inequality in (2)), i.e., q is a simple path
which closes a unique cycle C(q) with Pi containing e, and the cost of q equals the sum of cost
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shares Player i pays on the edges of Pi ∩ C(q): If there is no such tight alternative, increasing
the cost share ξi,e < c(e) without changing the other cost shares would yield a feasible solution
for LP(F ) with higher objective function value. We denote the edges of Pi ∩ C(q) as the edges
which are substituted by q.
Case L: Assume that e ∈ P1 holds (e ∈ P2 follows analogously). Under all tight alternatives
for Player 1 which substitute e, let q1 be smallest, that is, q1 minimizes the maximum occurring
order of an edge in C(q1) ∩ P1. Let f be the “last” edge which is substituted by q1, i.e., where
the maximum is attained. The situation for the case that f is in the middle part is illustrated
in Figure 5a; the other cases (f is in the right or left part) can be treated very similarly.
s2
s1
t1
t2
f
e
q1
(a) f is in the middle part
s2
s1
t1
t2
f
q1
(b) F ∗
Figure 5: Case L
We get that Player 1 pays the edges of C(q1)∩P1 before e (w.r.t. the ordering) completely since
those edges are not contained in P2 and e is the first edge that is not paid completely. The
same reasons yield ξ1,e < c(e). Furthermore, Player 1 pays nothing on the edges of C(q1) ∩ P1
after e. To see this, assume that there exists such an edge h with ξ1,h > 0. But then a push
operation with e and h (and a suitably small ε) yields a feasible solution for LP(F ), because
q1 is a smallest alternative for e, contradiction. Let F ∗ be the Steiner forest which arises from
F by adding q1 and deleting the edges of C(q1) ∩ P1 which are in the left part (cf. Figure 5b).
Since the cost of q1 equals the sum of cost shares of the deleted edges and this sum is strictly
smaller than the costs of these edges, c(F ∗) < c(F ). The full proof for Case L can be found in
the proof of Proposition 3, Subsection A.2.1.
Case M : Now both players need to have tight alternatives q1 and q2 for e. It is clear that
we can construct a cheaper Steiner forest if there are tight alternatives q1 and q2 for e which
substitute the same edges of the middle part, or a tight alternative for e which substitutes only
edges of the middle part. We then distinguish between the two cases that all tight alternatives
for e of one player substitute edges of the right part, or both players have a tight alternative for
e which substitutes edges of the left part. Since the first case can be treated similarly to Case
L, we describe how to proceed in the second case. Let q1 (for Player 1) and q2 (for Player 2) be
smallest tight alternatives for e which substitute edges of the left part. Consider the case that
q1 substitutes less edges of the middle part than q2, and q2 does not substitute edges of the right
part, see Figure 6 (the other cases follow similarly). Adding q1 and q2, and deleting the dashed
edges (cf. Figure 6) yields a Steiner forest F ∗ with smaller cost than F (note that Player 2 pays
nothing on the edges after e which are substituted by q2), and thus we get a contradiction. The
full proof for Case M can be found in the proof of Proposition 4, Subsection A.2.2.
s1
s2
t1
t2
e
q1
q2
s1
s2
t1
t2
q1
q2
Figure 6: Case M
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Case R: Note that in the Cases L and M we did not need any arguments according to BCs.
This already indicates that Case R is more complicated. We mention here only a few of the
proof ideas (a full proof can be found in Proposition 5, Subsection A.2.3).
Again, we consider a smallest alternative q1 of Player 1 for e (assuming that e ∈ P1). It is
easy to see that q1 has to substitute some edges of the middle part, since otherwise there is
a cheaper Steiner forest. The same argument shows that there has to be an edge f in the
middle part (substituted by q1) which Player 2 does not pay completely. Now we want to argue
that Player 2 needs to have a tight alternative which substitutes f . Note that for an arbitrary
PL-solution of LP(F ) we cannot guarantee that whenever a player does not pay an edge in the
middle part completely, this player has a tight alternative for this edge. However, we can achieve
this property for one fixed Player i by maximizing the sum of cost shares of Player i among all
optimal solutions for LP(F ) for which e is the first edge which is not completely paid. Let us
assume that this property holds for Player 2 and consider a tight alternative of Player 2 which
substitutes f . If this alternative substitutes only edges of the middle part, or the same edges
of the middle part as q1, one can construct a cheaper Steiner forest. The remaining subcases
can be organized as follows: If there is no tight alternative of Player 2 which substitutes f and
edges of the right part, let q2 be any tight alternative for f (which then substitutes edges of the
left part; Subcase R.3). Otherwise, let q2 be a tight alternative of Player 2 which substitutes f
and edges of the right part maximizing the minimum occuring order of an edge in C(q2) ∩ P2.
Then q2 can either substitute less (Subcase R.1) or more (Subcase R.2) edges of the middle part
than q1, see Figure 7 for the subcases that q1 (or q2 in R.2) does not substitute edges of the left
part.
s1
s2
t1
t2
f
e
q1
q2
(a) Subcase R.1
s1
s2
t1
t2
f
e
q1
q2
(b) Subcase R.2
Figure 7: Subcases R.1 and R.2
We now describe how to proceed with the situation illustrated in Figure 7a. One can construct
a cheaper Steiner forest if Player 2 completely pays the edges of the commonly used part which
are substituted by q1, but not by q2. Thus, there has to be such an edge h which Player 2 does
not pay completely, together with a tight alternative q′2 for h. Similarly as for q2, we have to
distinguish between several subcases depending on the properties of q′2, see Figure 8 for two
possible subcases.
s1
s2
t1
t2
h f
e
q1
q2
q′2
(a) Existence of tight alternatives for Player 1?
s1
s2
t1
t2
h f
e
q1
q2q′2
(b) Bad Configuration?
Figure 8: Different Subcases of R.1
First consider the subcase illustrated in Figure 8a. If Player 1 completely pays the edges of the
middle part which are not substituted by q1, using q1 and q′2 yields a cheaper Steiner forest,
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so we can assume that this does not hold. Now we would like to argue that there has to be
a tight alternative for Player 1 substituting such an edge; but as mentioned above, this is not
immediately clear. To ensure this, we introduced another additional property for the given cost
shares (for more details, see Definition 5 and Lemma 1 in Subsection A.2.3). We now consider
the subcase of Figure 8b, which turned out to be the most challenging problem in the proof.
Note that the subgraph illustrated Figure 8b is a BC1a only if the paths q1, q2 and q′2 are
pairwise node-disjoint and furthermore internal node-disjoint with P1 ∪P2. Depending on these
properties, we grouped all possible different situations in twelve “types” (Figure 9 illustrates two
of them).
s1
s2
t1
t2
h f
e
q1
q2q′2
s1
s2
t1
t2
h f
e
q′2
q1
q2
q′2
Figure 9: Two types of No Bad Configurations
In total, 16 subgraphs similar to the one illustrated in Figure 8b occur, for which we have to
investigate all twelve types, leading to 16 · 12 = 192 subcases (see Subsection A.2.3 and A.2.4).
5. Analyzing Different Graph Classes
In this section we show that various well-studied classes of graphs only contain strongly efficient
graphs. Furthermore some negative results are given, i.e. we present graph classes which do
contain non-efficient graphs.
Theorem 3. The following graph classes only contain strongly efficient graphs. This holds even
without specification of the terminal nodes s1, t1, s2 and t2:
(1) generalized series-parallel graphs,
(2) graphs with the property that all cycles have length ≤ 6,
(3) wheel and fan graphs.
Proof.
(1) We start with generalized series-parallel graphs. These graphs are known to be K4-minor-
free, i.e. K4 can not be obtained by a sequence of vertex deletions, edge deletions and / or
edge contractions. We will now show that every Bad Configuration contains K4 as a minor,
and therefore any generalized series-parallel graph can not contain a Bad Configuration,
hence every generalized series-parallel graph is strongly efficient.
The Bad Configuration BC1a is shown in Figure 10a. By contracting suitable edges we can
w.l.o.g. assume that all displayed lines are in fact edges. Deleting the vertices u, v, w and x
yields the graph displayed in Figure 10b. By contracting the thick edges, one gets the graph
shown in Figure 10c which is a K4.
For the Bad Configuration BC1b, we just need one additional edge contraction. It is easy
to check (and intuitively clear) that all other types of Bad Configurations must contain K4
as a minor (we leave this to the reader).
This shows that generalized series-parallel graphs only contain strongly efficient graphs.
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uw
v
x
(a) BC1a (b) After deleting u, v, w, x
(c) After contracting the thick edges
Figure 10: K4-minor of BC1a
(2) As all Bad Configurations contain at least one cycle with length greater or equal to seven,
graphs with the property that all cycles have length at most six are strongly efficient.
(3) Taking the cycle Cn and adding an additional vertex z, which is adjacent to all vertices
of Cn, yields the Wheel Wn. We will now show that for every n, the Wheel Wn can not
contain a Bad Configuration. Assume (on the contrary) that there is a BC1a (the other Bad
Configurations follow similarly). Figure 11a displays BC1a together with some notations
needed in the following.
If the paths a, b, c, d are all part of Cn, i.e. z is not contained in one of these paths, q2 and
q3 both have to contain z. Since q2 and q3 have to be node-disjoint in a BC1a, this is not
possible and z has to be contained in one of the paths a, b, c, d. More exactly, z is either the
endnode y of d or the node which is adjacent to y in d. Otherwise the paths f and g can not
exist, since they both have to contain at least one edge (and can not contain z). Figure 11b
displays the subcase that z is adjacent to y in d. But both remaining subcases also yield
contradictions: On the one hand q1 has to be node-disjoint with d, but on the other hand
it also has to contain z (by taking into account that q1 has to end in b, this holds even if v
is an endnode of q1). Therefore, Wn can not contain a BC1a.
u
w
y
v
x
a b c d
f
g
q1
q2 q3
(a) BC1a
y
x
v
z
(b) Subcase z is adjacent to y
Figure 11: Situation for Wn
A n-fan is a graph consisting of a path of length n and an additional vertex which is adjacent
to all vertices of the path. As these graphs are subgraphs of wheels, fan graphs are also
strongly efficient.
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Note that other K4-minor-free graphs are Cactus graphs, unicyclic graphs and trees. Therefore
these classes are also strongly efficient.
As all Bad Configurations contain at least 9 edges, all graphs with at most 8 edges are strongly
efficient. Furthermore, all graphs with at most 6 vertices are strongly efficient (as all Bad
Configurations contain at least 7 vertices).
Now we give some negative results.
Proposition 1. The following graph classes contain non-efficient graphs:
(1) bipartite graphs,
(2) chordal graphs,
(3) planar graphs.
Proof. We show that there exists a graph which contains a BC1a in each of the above mentioned
graph classes.
(1) Figure 12a shows a bipartite graph (large and small nodes constitute the bipartition) which
is a BC1a.
(2) BC1a is obviously contained in a complete graph (with a suitable number of vertices) and
complete graphs are chordal.
(3) Figure 12b shows a planar graph which is a BC1a.
s1
s2
t1
t2
(a) A bipartite graph which is a BC1a
s1
s2
t1
t2
(b) A planar graph which is a BC1a
Figure 12: Graphs containing a BC1a
We want to note that even if all edges of a graph have the same cost, an optimal Steiner forest
may not be enforceable: To see that, observe that the costs displayed in Figure 2 are all integral.
Contracting the edges with cost 0, replacing all remaining edges by paths with length equal to
the edge costs and assigning cost 1 to all edges yields a graph with the desired property.
6. A Lower Bound for the PoS for Two Player Games
In this section we derive a lower bound for the price of stability.
Proposition 2. The PoS for two-player undirected network design games is at least 1514 .
Proof. Let us consider the instance of a Bad Configuration shown in Figure 13, where the edges
are labelled with their costs and x ∈ R+.
By considering all possible Steiner forests, one can easily show that the unique optimal Steiner
forest consists of all solid edges and has cost 14x+ 8, whereas all other possible Steiner forests
have cost at least 15x+ 8.
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s2
s1
t1
t2
3x+ 2
2x+ 1 x+ 1 2x+ 1
3x+ 1
3x+ 2
4x+ 24x+ 2
6x+ 3
Figure 13: A lower bound for the PoS
Furthermore, the optimal Steiner forest is not enforceable since the sum of collectable cost shares
is obviously bounded above by 14x+7 (6x+ 3 for Player 1 and 8x+ 4 for Player 2). But there
is a Steiner forest with cost 15x + 8 which is enforceable: Player 1 takes the edge s1 − t1 with
cost 6x + 3, Player 2 takes the two dashed edges with cost 4x+ 2 and the solid edge with cost
x+1. This yields an enforceable Steiner forest since both players take (disjoint) shortest paths.
Therefore, the PoS for two-player undirected network design games is at least 15x+814x+8 . As x tends
to infinity, we achieve a lower bound for the PoS of 1514 .
7. Summary and Open Problems
We derived a complete characterization of efficient graphs for two-player network design games
showing that a graph is efficient iff certain forbidden subgraphs are not present. Our work leads
to several interesting research questions as outlined below.
• What is the computational complexity of recognizing a Bad Configuration?
• How does a characterization look like for three or more players?
Our characterization prescribes substructures of worst-case instances regarding the long-standing
PoS question for separable protocols. We conjecture the following bounds:
Conjecture 1. The PoS for two-player undirected network design games is 15/14 (Proposition 2).
Conjecture 2. The PoS for undirected network design games with n players is < 2.
Conjecture 3. The PoS for directed network design games with n players is 2.
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Appendix
A. Proof of our Main Theorem
A.1. (2) implies (1)
We show this by contraposition, thus we assume that (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) contains a Bad Con-
figuration. Then we define a cost function c so that the optimal Steiner forest is unique and not
enforceable, showing the claim.
To this end we choose a subgraph that is a BC and set c(e) =∞ if the edge e is not contained
in this subgraph. The costs of the edges in the BC depend on the type of the BC, thus we now
have to distinguish between the different types of BCs. In the following we have displayed costs
for each type, where one should note:
• we have always chosen (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2) since the other cases are analogous;
• paths with cost > 0 are labelled with their cost;
• if a path consists of more than one edge, one can choose the costs of the corresponding edges
arbitrarily so that they sum up to the displayed cost on the path;
• all paths with nonzero costs contain at least one edge because of the definition of the corre-
sponding type of BC;
• the solid lines always build the (unique) optimal Steiner Forest OPT (with cost c(OPT ));
• we do not display costs for all subcases (not displayed subcases can be treated analogously).
s1
s2
t1
t2
5
3 2 3
4
5
9
6
6
BC1a
s1
s2
t1
t2
5
3 2 3
4
5
9
6 6
BC1b
s1
s2
t1
t2
5
6
3
5
5 2 3
6
5
5
6
BC2a
s1
s2
t1
t2
5 6
3
5
5 2 3
6
5
5
6
BC2c
s1
s2
t1
t2
5
3 2 3
4
5
9
6
6
BC3
s1
s2
t1
t2
6
3
5
5 2 3
6
5
55
6
BC4a
Figure 14: For BC1a, b and BC3: c(OPT ) = 22; sum of cost shares ≤ 9 + 6 + 6 = 21;
for BC2a, c and BC4a: c(OPT ) = 26; sum of cost shares ≤ 11 + 8 + 6 = 25.
A.2. (1) implies (3)
Consider an arbitrary optimal Steiner forest F (w.r.t. an arbitrary cost function c) and an
optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi of the corresponding LP(F ). If condition (BB) is satisfied, the
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statement is true. So we assume that there is an edge that is not completely paid. Note that
P1 ∩P2 has to contain at least one edge, otherwise the statement is clear. Furthermore, since F
contains no cycles, P1 ∩ P2 has to be a simple path (in the following, when we speak of a path,
we always mean a simple path). We refer to the edges of P1 ∩P2 as the commonly used edges or
the commonly used part. To obtain PL-cost shares (see Definition 4 in Subsection 4.2), we apply
Algorithm PushLeft (see Subsection A.2.5; this procedure terminates and yields the desired
property). Let e be the first edge (with respect to the order displayed in Figure 15) which is not
completely paid according to the computed PL-cost shares (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi .
s1
s2
t1
t2
1
ℓ1
ℓ1 + 1
ℓ1 + ℓ2
ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m
ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ 1
ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ r1
ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ r1 + 1
ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ r1 + r2
Figure 15: Ordering of the edges of F
We distinguish between the following three cases:
Case L: ord(e) ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2,
Case M : ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 ≤ ord(e) ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m,
Case R: ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ 1 ≤ ord(e).
The CasesM and R have further subcases, mostly depending on properties of certain paths which
we construct during the cases. Figure 17 illustrates the case distinction for the most important
subcases, where the nodes are labelled with the subcases (note that the Subcases R.1.1, R.1.2,
R.1.2.1 and R.2 have further subsubcases which are illustrated in Figure 24). In each of these
subcases, we get a contradiction (see Proposition 3, Proposition 4 and Proposition 5), therefore
each edge in F has to be completely paid and thus F is enforceable.
We now introduce some notation we will use throughout the paper.
• For α ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ1+ ℓ2+m+ r1 + r2}, we denote the edge of order α with eα. In all following
figures, we label the edges (except e) with their order.
• For I ⊆ {1, . . . , ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m + r1 + r2} we call eα the smallest (largest) edge with respect to
I, if α is the smallest (largest) number in I.
• We call P ′i ∈ Pi a (tight) alternative for Player i and edge eα, if eα /∈ P
′
i and the corresponding
restriction (2) of LP(F ) is tight. Adding the edges of P ′i to Pi yields a unique cycle C with
eα ∈ C. Let eβ (eγ) be the smallest (largest) edge in C ∩ Pi and q := C \ Pi. For our proof it
is sufficient to consider the subpath q of P ′i and therefore we refer to q as a (tight) alternative
for eα, defined by β and γ (β ≤ γ; omitting P ′i ).
• If q is a (tight) alternative for Player i, defined by β and γ, we will denote the edges
{eβ , . . . , eγ} ∩ Pi as the edges which are substituted by q. We call the nodes of these edges
(except for the two endnodes of q) the nodes which are substituted by q.
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• We call a (tight) alternative q, defined by β and γ, a left alternative if β < ℓ1 + ℓ2, and a
right alternative if γ > ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m.
• If q (defined by β and γ) and p (defined by β′ and γ′) are two left alternatives of a player, we
say that q is smaller (larger) than p if γ < γ′ (γ > γ′). If q and p are right alternatives, q is
smaller (larger) than p if β > β′ (β < β′).
Note that an alternative can simultaneously be a right and a left alternative. Furthermore, if p
is a smaller alternative than q, this means that p substitutes less commonly used edges than q.
For illustration, consider the graph in Figure 16 where the solid lines form an optimal Steiner
forest and the dashed lines are all existing tight alternatives.
s1
s2
t1
t2
β
β′
β¯
γ′ α µ′ γ¯ µ
γ
ν
ν ′
q1
q′1 q¯1
q′2
q2
Figure 16: Used notation
The alternatives q1 (defined by β and γ), q′1 (defined by β
′ and γ′) and q¯1 (defined by β¯ and γ¯)
are all left alternatives of Player 1, where q1 (which is also a right alternative) is the largest and
q′1 is the smallest left alternative. We will sometimes need the smallest (or largest) alternative
that substitutes a certain edge. For example, q¯1 is the smallest left alternative that substitutes
eα. For Player 2, q2 (defined by µ and ν) and q′2 (defined by µ
′ and ν ′) are right alternatives
where q′2 is larger than q2.
b
L b b M
M.1 b b ¬M.1
b
M.2
b
M.3
b
M.4
b
M.5
b
M.6
b
M.7
b R
R.1 b
b
R.1.1
b R.1.2
b
R.1.2.1
b
R.1.2.2
b
R.2
b
R.3
Figure 17: Tree for case distinction in the proof of Theorem 2 (further explanation below)
We now explain the case distinction displayed in Figure 17. In all three cases (L, M and R) we
construct tight alternatives. Different properties of these alternatives yield different subcases.
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For Case M , we distinguish between the case that there is a tight alternative which substitutes
e and is neither a right nor a left alternative (M.1), or not. The Subcases M.2, M.3, M.4 cover
the case that there are two tight alternatives (one for each Player) which substitute e and the
same commonly used edges. For the case that this is not true, we distinguish between further
properties of two tight alternatives (M.5, M.6, M.7).
For Case R, we consider two tight alternatives q1 (for Player 1) and q2 (for Player 2) (with
certain properties). Either q2 is a left alternative (R.3), or not. If q2 is a right alternative,
we distinguish between the case that q2 substitutes more (R.2) or less (R.1) commonly used
edges than q1. In R.1, we consider a third alternative q′2 which can be a left (R.1.1) or a right
(R.1.2) alternative. The subcase R.1.2 has two further subcases (R.1.2.1 and R.1.2.2) which we
explain in more detail in Subsection A.2.3, where even further subcases of Case R.1 and R.2 are
discussed.
A.2.1. Case L
Proposition 3. In Case L, that means ord(e) ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2, we get a contradiction.
Proof. We describe the case ord(e) ≤ ℓ1 in detail, the case ℓ1 + 1 ≤ ord(e) ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 follows
analogously. Since ξ1,e < c(e) (and e /∈ P2), we get that Player 1 has a (tight) left alternative
that substitutes e: Suppose there would be no such tight alternative. In this case, we could
increase the cost share ξ1,e < c(e) of Player 1 on edge e without changing the cost shares on
the other edges and would still get a feasible solution for LP(F ). Furthermore, this solution has
a higher objective function value, a contradiction to the optimality of the given cost shares for
LP(F ).
We consider a smallest left alternative q1 for e (defined by β and γ). The situation is illustrated
in Figure 18a3, where the solid lines represent the optimal Steiner forest F .
s1
s2
t1
t2
β
γ
e
q1
(a) Case L
s1
s2
t1
t2
β
γ
e
q1
(b) F ∗ in Case L
Figure 18: Situation in Case L
Regarding the cost shares of Player 1, we get
ξ1,ei

= c(ei), β ≤ i < ord(e),
< c(e), i = ord(e),
= 0, ord(e) < i ≤ γ.
The first two cases are clear due to the fact that those edges are not contained in P2 and the
choice of e as the first edge that is not paid completely. The third case holds since q1 is a smallest
left alternative for e and the cost shares are pushed to the left.
Now we use this to construct a different Steiner forest F ∗ with c(F ∗) < c(F ), which is a
contradiction. Let F ∗ = F \ {eβ , . . . , eℓ1} ∪ q1, see Figure 18b, where the solid lines represent
F ∗. Note that it is possible that F ∗ (as defined above) is no Steiner forest, because q1 can
contain nodes or edges of P2 \ P1. But then it is clear that F ∗ contains a Steiner forest with
3Note that γ ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ 1 or γ ≤ ℓ1 doesn’t change the argumentation; in the latter case, we only have to
choose a slightly different F ∗.
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cost at most c(F ∗). In the following, we will not mention that in detail again: If we speak of
a cheaper Steiner forest or a cheaper solution, we include the possibility that we have to delete
edges of the considered subgraph to get a Steiner forest with lower costs than F .
Considering the difference in costs, we get (for simplification, we omit i ∈ P1 in the summation
indices of the following sums):
c(F ∗)− c(F ) = c(q1)−
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei) =
γ∑
i=β
ξ1,ei −
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei) =
=
ord(e)−1∑
i=β
ξ1,ei︸︷︷︸
=c(ei)
+ ξ1,e︸︷︷︸
<c(e)
+
γ∑
i=ord(e)+1
ξ1,ei︸︷︷︸
=0
−
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei) <
<
ord(e)∑
i=β
c(ei)−
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei) ≤
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei)−
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei) = 0.
The second equality follows from the fact that q1 is a tight alternative. The strict inequality is
due to our above observations of ξ1,ei and the last inequality follows from ord(e) ≤ ℓ1 and that
costs are nonnegative.
A.2.2. Case M
Proposition 4. In CaseM , that means ℓ1+ℓ2+1 ≤ ord(e) ≤ ℓ1+ℓ2+m, we get a contradiction.
Proof. Since the cost shares are optimal and ξ1,e+ ξ2,e < c(e), both players need to have a tight
alternative for e.
In Subcase M.1, Player 1 has a tight alternative q1 for e, defined by β and γ (or Player 2 has
a tight alternative q2 for e, defined by µ and ν), which is neither a left nor a right alternative.
Figure 19a illustrates this Subcase for Player 1. We get a contradiction since one can construct
a cheaper Steiner forest F ∗: For Player 1, consider F ∗ := F \ {eβ , . . . , eγ} ∪ q1. Using that q1 is
a tight alternative, ξ1,ei ≤ c(ei) for each edge ei and ξ1,e < c(e), we get
c(F ∗)− c(F ) = c(q1)−
γ∑
i=β
c(ei) =
γ∑
i=β
ξ1,ei −
γ∑
i=β
c(ei) < 0.
s1
s2
t1
t2
β e γ
q1
(a) Subcase M.1
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µ
e γ = ν
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q2
(b) Subcase M.2
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β = µ e
γ
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(c) Subcase M.3
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γ
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q2
(d) Subcase M.4
Figure 19: Some subcases in Case M
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Obviously, we can construct a similar F ∗ if Player 2 has a tight alternative which substitutes
only commonly used edges. Therefore we can assume that all tight alternatives which substitute
e are either left or right alternatives (or both).
Another subcase is that Player 1 has a tight alternative q1 for e, defined by β and γ, and Player
2 has a tight alternative q2 for e, defined by µ and ν, so that both alternatives substitute the
same edges of P1 ∩P2. Referring to the assumption above this leads to three different subcases,
illustrated in Figures 19b, 19c and 19d:
Subcase M .2: If q1 is a left alternative which does not substitute all commonly used edges, q2
also has to be a left alternative and γ = ν has to hold;
Subcase M .3: If q1 is a right alternative which does not substitute all commonly used edges, q2
also has to be a right alternative and β = µ has to hold;
Subcase M .4: If q1 is an alternative which substitutes all commonly used edges, q2 also has to
be an alternative which substitutes all commonly used edges.
In all three subcases, we can again construct a cheaper Steiner forest F ∗: For Subcase M.2,
consider
F ∗ := F \ ({eβ , . . . , eℓ1} ∪ {eµ, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2} ∪ {eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , e, . . . , eγ}) ∪ (q1 ∪ q2) ,
illustrated in Figure 20.
s1
s2
t1
t2
β
µ
e γ = ν
q1
q2
Figure 20: F ∗ for Subcase M.2
For the difference in costs, we get
c(F ∗)− c(F ) = c(q1) + c(q2)−
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei)−
ℓ1+ℓ2∑
i=µ
c(ei)−
γ∑
i=ℓ1+ℓ2+1
c(ei) =
=
ℓ1∑
i=β
ξ1,ei︸︷︷︸
≤c(ei)
+
ℓ1+ℓ2∑
i=µ
ξ2,ei︸︷︷︸
≤c(ei)
+
γ∑
i=ℓ1+ℓ2+1
(ξ1,ei + ξ2,ei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤c(ei)
−
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei)−
ℓ1+ℓ2∑
i=µ
c(ei)−
γ∑
i=ℓ1+ℓ2+1
c(ei) < 0.
The second equality follows from the fact that q1 and q2 are tight alternatives and the strict
inequality is due to ξ1,e + ξ2,e < c(e). The Subcases M.3 and M.4 are very similar, only F ∗
differs slightly; the proof is therefore left to the reader.
We can now assume that there are no tight alternatives for the players in which they substitute
the same commonly used edges. The following subcases, for which we will need the properties
of the PL-cost shares, cover the remaining situation of Case M :
Subcase M.5: All tight alternatives of Player 1 for e are right alternatives,
Subcase M.6: All tight alternatives of Player 2 for e are right alternatives,
Subcase M.7: Player 1 and Player 2 both have a tight left alternative for e.
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For Subcase M.5, let q1, defined by β and γ, be a tight right alternative of Player 1 for e which
has the smallest possible value of γ among all such alternatives. The situation is illustrated in
Figure 21a.
s1
s2
t1
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(a) Subcase M.5
s1
s2
t1
t2
β e
γ
q1
(b) F ∗ in Subcase M.5
Figure 21: Situation in Subcase M.5
Since q1 is a tight alternative, c(q1) equals the sum of cost shares of Player 1 for the edges which
are substituted by q1. Furthermore, we get for the PL-cost shares (by our choice of q1)
ξ1,ei

≤ c(ei), β ≤ i ≤ ord(e)− 1,
< c(ei), i = ord(e),
= 0, ord(e) + 1 ≤ i ≤ γ.
Altogether, since costs are nonnegative and ord(e) ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m,
c(q1) <
ℓ1+ℓ2+m∑
i=β
c(ei)
holds and thus F ∗ := F \ {eβ , . . . , e, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2+m} ∪ q1 (see Figure 21b) is a cheaper Steiner
forest. It is clear that a similar F ∗ with lower cost than F can be constructed using a suitable
tight alternative for Player 2 in Subcase M.6.
Concluding, we consider Subcase M.7. Let q1 (defined by β and γ) be a smallest left alternative
of Player 1 for e and q2 (defined by µ and ν) a smallest left alternative of Player 2 for e. We
now describe the subcase γ < ν in detail (see Figure 22a for ν ≤ ℓ1+ ℓ2+m), the subcase γ > ν
follows analogously.
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(a) Subcase M.7, γ < ν
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(b) F ∗ in Subcase M.7, γ < ν
Figure 22: Situation in Subcase M.7, γ < ν
Since q1 and q2 are tight alternatives, we get
c(q1) =
ℓ1∑
i=β
ξ1,ei +
γ∑
i=ℓ1+ℓ2+1
ξ1,ei and c(q2) =
ℓ1+ℓ2∑
i=µ
ξ2,ei +
ν∑
i=ℓ1+ℓ2+1
ξ2,ei.
Furthermore we get for the PL-cost shares (by our choice of q1, q2 and e)
ξ1,ei =
{
c(ei), β ≤ i ≤ ℓ1,
0, ord(e) < i ≤ γ,
ξ2,ei =
{
c(ei), µ ≤ i ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2,
0, ord(e) < i ≤ ν,
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and
ξ1,ei + ξ2,ei
{
= c(ei), ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 ≤ i < ord(e),
< c(e), i = ord(e).
This yields
c(q1) + c(q2) =
ℓ1∑
i=β
c(ei) +
ℓ1+ℓ2∑
i=µ
c(ei) +
ord(e)−1∑
i=ℓ1+ℓ2+1
c(ei) + ξ1,e + ξ2,e︸ ︷︷ ︸
<c(e)
and therefore
F ∗ := F \ ({eβ , . . . , eℓ1} ∪ {eµ, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2} ∪ {eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , e, . . . , eγ}) ∪ (q1 ∪ q2),
see Figure 22b, is a cheaper Steiner forest.
A.2.3. Case R
Now we consider Case R, that is, ℓ1+ ℓ2+m+1 ≤ ord(e). We can assume w.l.o.g. e ∈ P1 since
the other case (e ∈ P2) follows analogously. To proof this last case, we need special properties
of the cost shares. We introduce the following operation (which we denote as CHANGE(j, i)):
Increase ξ2,ei and ξ1,ej , and simultaneously decrease ξ2,ej and ξ1,ei , until either
• an alternative of Player 1 for ej gets tight, or
• an alternative of Player 2 for ei gets tight, or
• ξ2,ei = c(ei), or
• ξ2,ej = 0.
If this changes the cost shares we call CHANGE(j, i) feasible (and otherwise infeasible). The reason
why we introduce the described operation is to get cost shares with the following properties:
Definition 5. Let F be an optimal Steiner forest which is not enforceable, (ξi,f )i∈{1,2},f∈Pi an
optimal solution for LP(F ) and e (with ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m + 1 ≤ ord(e)) the first edge which is not
completely paid. We call this assignment of cost shares maximized for Player 2 if the following
two properties hold:
(2M) The sum of cost shares of Player 2 is maximal among all optimal assignments in which e
is the first edge that is not completely paid.
(NC) For every pair i, j ∈ {ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1, . . . , ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m} with j < i, CHANGE(j, i) is not feasible.
Note that property (2M) implies that for every commonly used edge ei that Player 2 does not
pay completely she has a tight alternative for ei, otherwise we could simultaneously increase
ξ2,ei and decrease ξ1,ei and get a solution in which the sum of cost shares of Player 2 is larger
than before.
We now want to give a short intuition why it seems reasonable to consider cost shares which are
maximized for Player 2. In an optimal assignment of cost shares, changing the cost shares in a
feasible way according to LP(F ) can not result in a higher objective function value. In our case
this means that changing the cost shares can not yield that Player 1 can increase her cost share
on e (while the sum of the other cost shares remains the same). Property (2M) is therefore clear:
If Player 2 could pay more, this could possibly yield that there is no tight alternative left for e
and then Player 1 can increase her cost share on e. Property (NC) is linked with the fact that
the edge e is not contained in the set of the commonly used edges, in particular that the order of
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e is at least ℓ1+ ℓ2+m+1. As we will see in the proof of Proposition 5, there has to be a right
alternative for Player 1 which substitutes e. If there is a pair i, j ∈ {ℓ1+ ℓ2+1, . . . , ℓ1+ ℓ2+m}
with j < i for which CHANGE(j, i) is feasible, this could possibly yield an assignment of cost
shares for which this right alternative for e is not tight anymore and Player 1 could possibly
increase her cost share on e.
In the following, we assume that the cost shares are maximized for Player 2. The existence of
such cost shares follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 1. Let F be an optimal Steiner forest which is not enforceable. Then there is an optimal
solution for LP(F ) which is maximized for Player 2.
To show this lemma, we will use the following algorithm that yields cost shares with prop-
erty (NC).
Algorithm 1: Change
Data: Optimal Steiner forest F and an optimal solution (ξi,f )i∈{1,2},f∈Pi for LP(F ).
Result: Transformed optimal solution (ξi,f )i∈{1,2},f∈Pi for LP(F ).
1 for i = ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m down to ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 do
2 for j = i− 1 down to ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 do
3 if CHANGE(j, i) is feasible then
4 CHANGE(j, i)
5 end
6 end
7 end
Proof of Lemma 1. As F is not enforceable there is an optimal PL-solution for LP(F ) with
ℓ1 + ℓ2 + m + 1 ≤ ord(e) (where e is the first edge which is not completely paid). Among
all optimal assignments of cost shares in which e is the first edge that is not completely paid,
choose an assignment in which the sum of the cost shares of Player 2 is maximal. Now we
transform these cost shares by using Algorithm Change and analyze the resulting cost shares.
Obviously the transformed solution (ξi,f )i∈{1,2},f∈Pi is feasible and still optimal. Note that the
cost shares are only changed for the commonly used edges and these edges remain completely
paid. Therefore, e is still the first edge that is not completely paid. Furthermore the sum of
cost shares of Player 2 remains the same. Therefore property (2M) always holds.
We now show that property (NC) holds after the execution of the procedure. Assume that this
is not true and consider a pair (i, j) with j < i where CHANGE(j, i) is feasible. In particular, this
means that ξ2,ej > 0 and ξ2,ei < c(ei). Let ξ
′
2,ej
and ξ′2,ei be the cost shares for these two edges
directly after we executed CHANGE(j, i) during Algorithm Change (or detected infeasibility of
this change). It is clear that ξ′2,ei < c(ei) holds since the cost shares for ei were never decreased
after CHANGE(j, i). There are two cases: Either ξ′2,ej > 0 or ξ
′
2,ej
= 0 holds. In the first case
there either has to be a left alternative of Player 1 for ej that does not substitute ei, or a
right alternative of Player 2 for ei that does not substitute ej. But this is a contradiction
to our assumption that CHANGE(j, i) is now feasible, since left alternatives of Player 1 and
right alternatives of Player 2 stay tight during the algorithm. Therefore ξ′2,ej = 0 has to hold.
Since ξ2,ej > 0, there has to be a suitable k < j so that CHANGE(k, j) was feasible during
Algorithm Change. Let ξ′′2,ek and ξ
′′
2,ei
be the cost shares directly after we executed CHANGE(k, i)
in Algorithm Change (or detected infeasibility of this change). Note that ξ′′2,ek > 0 because
CHANGE(k, j) was feasible and ξ′′2,ei < c(ei) holds since we never decreased this cost share after
CHANGE(k, i). Therefore there either has to be a tight left alternative of Player 1 for ek that
does not substitute ei or a tight right alternative of Player 2 for ei that does not substitute
ek. In the first case, this alternative has to substitute ej because otherwise CHANGE(k, j) would
not have been feasible. But then CHANGE(j, i) can not be feasible now. In the other case this
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alternative has to substitute ej because otherwise CHANGE(j, i) can not be feasible now. But
then CHANGE(k, j) would not have been feasible.
As already mentioned in Subsection 4.2, we have to consider subgraphs which are “almost” Bad
Configurations. In the following we give an exact definition.
Definition 6. We call a subgraph of (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) a Preliminary Bad Configuration
(PBC), if there are vertices u, v, w, x satisfying the following conditions (see Figure 23 for illus-
tration):
(1) u, v are the terminal nodes of one player and w, x the terminal nodes of the other player;
(2) There is a u-v-path Pu and a w-x-path Pℓ with
• Pu ∪ Pℓ contains no cycle;
• Pu and Pℓ are not edge-disjoint (let M be the unique subpath of Pu which is also
contained in Pℓ (“commonly used edges”));
• If we consider Pu as directed from u to v and Pℓ as directed from w to x, this induces
the same direction on M ;
• The subpath Ru of Pu which connects M with v contains at least one edge;
• The subpath Lℓ of Pℓ which connects w with M contains at least one edge;
• The subpath Rℓ of Pℓ which connects x with M contains at least one edge.
(3) There is a path q1 which closes a unique cycle C1 with Pu, where C1 contains edges from
Ru and M (edges from Lu are also allowed, but not necessary; this results in the two cases
displayed in Figure 23).
(4) There is a path q2 which closes a unique cycle C2 with Pℓ, where C2 contains edges from
Lℓ and M , and M \ C2 contains at least one edge.
(5) There is a path q3 which closes a unique cycle C3 with Pℓ, where C3 contains edges from
Rℓ and M , and M \ C3 contains at least one edge.
(6) C := C2 ∩ C3 ∩M contains at least one edge and C ⊆ C1.
(7) (M ∩ C1 ∩ C2) \ C contains at least one edge.
(8) (M ∩ C1 ∩ C3) \ C contains at least one edge .
u
w
v
x
q1
q2
q3
(a) C1 does not contain edges of Lu, “q1 small”
u
w
v
x
q1
q2 q3
(b) C1 contains at least one edge of Lu, “q1 big”
Figure 23: PBCs; dashed lines may contain only one node.
Note that the uniqueness of the cycle C1 implies that q1 and Pu are internal (i.e. except for the
endnodes of q1) node-disjoint. Analogously we get that q2 (q3) and Pℓ are internal node-disjoint.
However, the paths q1, q2 and q3 do not have to be node-disjoint. Furthermore, q1 can (internally;
i.e. not an endnode of q1) contain nodes of Lℓ and/or Rℓ, as well as q2 or q3 can (internally)
contain nodes of Lu and/or Ru. In the following, we omit the term “internally”. Depending on
these properties, we call a PBC a Bad Configuration (BC) or a No Bad Configuration (NBC)
(see Definition 7 and Definition 8).
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We now start with the proof of Case R. Similar as for Case M , we get several subcases which
mostly depend on properties of constructed tight alternatives. Figure 24 illustrates the most
important subcases of Subcase R.1 (cf. Figure 17); not displayed subcases easily yield cheaper
Steiner forests. In the subcases R.1.2.1 and R.1.2.2 we analyze why CHANGE(ρ, σ) (for certain
edges eρ and eσ) is not feasible: either Player 1 has a tight alternative which substitutes eρ, but
not eσ (R.1.2.1) or Player 2 has a tight alternative which substitutes eσ, but not eρ (R.1.2.2). The
subcases labelled with PBC1 - PBC11 correspond to constructed subgraphs which are PBCs and
these subcases are further analyzed in Subsection A.2.4: We first derive properties for certain
PBCs which are no BCs (so-called NBCs, see Definition 8 and Lemma 3 - Lemma 14) and show
that the subgraphs PBC1-PBC11 have to be NBCs (see Lemma 2). Finally we show that the
properties of NBCs contradict the properties of PBC1-PBC11 (Lemma 15 - Lemma 19).
For Subcase R.2, we get the two subcases PBC12 and PBC13 which are analyzed in the same
manner as PBC1-PBC11 (see Subsection A.2.4). In Subcase R.3 we have to consider PBC14
(also analyzed in the same manner).
b R.1
b
R.1.1
b
PBC1
b
PBC2
b
PBC3
b
PBC4
b
PBC5
b
R.1.2
b
PBC6
b
PBC7
b R.1.2.1
b
PBC8
b
PBC9
b
PBC10
b
PBC11
b
R.1.2.2
Figure 24: Tree for case distinction of Subcase R.1 in the proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. In Case R, that means ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ 1 ≤ ord(e), we get a contradiction.
Proof. As already mentioned we can assume w.l.o.g. e ∈ P1. Since e is not completely paid,
Player 1 must have a tight right alternative which substitutes e. Let q1, defined by β and γ, be
a smallest such alternative. It is clear that β ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m has to hold since otherwise we get a
cheaper Steiner forest by using q1. If Player 2 pays all commonly used edges which are substi-
tuted by q1, we get a cheaper Steiner forest by substituting q1 for {eℓ1+ℓ2+m+1, . . . , e, . . . , eγ}.
Therefore let eα be the biggest commonly used edge which is not paid completely by Player 2.
This implies ξ2,ei = c(ei) for all i ∈ {α+1, . . . , ℓ1+ℓ2+m}. Since our cost shares are maximized
for Player 2, she has a tight alternative which substitutes eα. If there is such an alternative
which is a right alternative, let q2, defined by µ and ν, be a smallest. Otherwise, let q2 be any
left alternative. Note that any tight alternative which substitutes eα has to be a right or left
one, otherwise we get a contradiction to the optimality of F . Furthermore we can again exclude
the case that there is a tight alternative for Player 1 which substitutes e and a corresponding
tight alternative for Player 2 which substitutes the same commonly used edges. This leads to
the following three different subcases which are illustrated in Figure 25:
Subcase R.1 ν ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ r1 + 1 and β + 1 ≤ µ ≤ α;
Subcase R.2 ν ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ r1 + 1 and ℓ1 + 1 ≤ µ ≤ β − 1;
Subcase R.3 ℓ1 + 1 ≤ µ ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 and ν ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m.
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(a) Subcase R.1 (note that β ≤ ℓ1 is also possible.)
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(b) Subcase R.2 (note that µ ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 is also possi-
ble.)
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β να
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e
q1
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(c) Subcase R.3
Figure 25: Subcases in Case R
Subcase R.1
If Player 2 pays all commonly used edges which are substituted by q1, but not by q2, we get
a cheaper solution. Therefore let eσ be the largest such edge which Player 2 does not pay
completely. Since the cost shares are maximized by Player 2 there has to be a tight alternative
for this edge.
Subcase R.1.1
We first consider the subcase that there is a left alternative for eσ; let q′2, defined by µ
′ and ν ′,
be a largest such one. We now show that β ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 (i.e. q1 small) and ν ′ < µ has to hold:
First assume that q1 is big, i.e. β ≤ ℓ1 holds. If ν ′ ≥ α or ν ′ ≤ µ−1we can use q1, q′2 (and q2 in the
latter case) to get a cheaper solution. Therefore we can assume that ν ′ ∈ {µ, . . . , α−1}. It is clear
that this has to hold for all left alternatives which substitute eσ. In the following, we consider
the smallest such alternative q′′2 . Then (P1, P2, q1, q
′′
2 , q2) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2).
We denote this subcase of R.1.1 as PBC1 and analyze it in Lemma 15, showing that PBC1 is
not possible. Thus we have shown that q1 cannot be big.
Now assume that ν ′ ≥ µ holds (and q1 is small). Then we distinguish between µ ≤ ν ′ < ℓ1+ℓ2+m
and ν ′ ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m (i.e. ν ′ = ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m or ν ′ ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m+ r1 + 1).
If µ ≤ ν ′ < ℓ1+ℓ2+m holds, (P1, P2, q1, q′2, q2) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2) (Subcase
PBC2). We treat this case in Lemma 19 and get ν ′ < ℓ1 + ℓ2 + m is not possible. Now we
consider the case ν ′ ≥ ℓ1+ ℓ2+m. If Player 1 pays the edges eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eβ−1 completely or q1
substitutes all commonly used edges, we get a cheaper solution by using q1 and q′2. Therefore let
eτ be the largest such edge which Player 1 does not pay completely. Furthermore, let eρ be the
smallest edge in {eβ , . . . , eµ−1} which is not paid completely by Player 2. We now analyze why
CHANGE(τ, ρ) is not feasible. Either there is a right alternative for Player 2 which substitutes eρ,
but not eτ (we say that the changes are not feasible for Player 2 ), or there is a left alternative
for Player 1 which substitutes eτ , but not eρ (the changes are not feasible for Player 1 ). If
the changes are not feasible for Player 2, there has to be a right alternative which substitutes
eρ, but not eτ . But then we get a cheaper solution by using this alternative and q1 (note that
Player 1 pays the edges eτ+1, . . . , eβ−1 and Player 2 pays eβ , . . . , eρ−1). Therefore the changes
for Player 1 can not be feasible. That means that there is a left alternative for Player 1 which
substitutes eτ , but not eρ. Let q′1, defined by β
′ and γ′, be a smallest. If τ ≤ γ′ ≤ β − 1, we can
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use q′1, q1 and q
′
2 to construct a cheaper Steiner forest. Therefore, the situation is as illustrated
in Figure 26.
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τ β γ′ ρ σ µ α
e
γ
ν
ν ′
q′1
q2
q′2
q1
Figure 26: Subcase PBC3 (note that the order of ν and ν ′ is not relevant)
Now (P2, P1, q′2, q1, q
′
1) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1) (Subcase PBC3). Lemma 19
shows that ν ′ ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m is also not possible.
Overall we showed that ν ′ < µ and β ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 has to hold, see Figure 27.
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Figure 27: Subcase of R.1.1
If Player 1 pays the edges eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eβ−1 or q1 substitutes all commonly used edges, we
get a cheaper solution by using q1, q′2 and q2 because Player 2 pays the edges eν′+1, . . . , eµ−1.
Otherwise let eρ be the largest such edge which Player 1 does not pay completely. Since the
cost shares are maximized for Player 2, CHANGE(ρ, σ) can not be feasible and we have to analyze
why.
If the changes for Player 1 are not feasible, there has to be a left alternative q′1, defined by β
′
and γ′, that substitutes eρ but not eσ . If γ′ ≤ β − 1, we can use q1, q′1, q2 and q
′
2 to construct
a cheaper Steiner forest. Therefore γ′ ∈ {β, . . . , σ − 1} has to hold and (P2, P1, q′2, q1, q
′
1) is a
PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1) (Subcase PBC4). As Lemma 19 shows, Subcase PBC4 can
not occur, i.e. the changes for Player 1 are feasible, but not the changes for Player 2.
Thus there has to be a right alternative q¯2 for Player 2, defined by µ¯ and ν¯, which substitutes
eσ but not eρ. If µ¯ ≤ β holds, we can use q1 and q¯2 to get a cheaper solution (note that Player 1
pays the edges eρ+1, . . . , eβ−1 by the choice of ρ). Therefore we get µ¯ ∈ {β + 1, . . . , σ} and
(P1, P2, q1, q
′
2, q¯2) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2) (Subcase PBC5). As this subcase can
not occur (see Lemma 19), this completes Subcase R.1.1 (Player 2 has a left alternative for eσ).
Subcase R.1.2
We can now assume that there are only right alternatives for eσ and consider a largest such
alternative q′2 (defined by µ
′ and ν ′).
Let us first assume that q1 substitutes more commonly used edges than q′2 (if both alternatives
substitute the same commonly used edges, we obviously get a cheaper Steiner forest). If Player 2
pays the edges of the commonly used path which are substituted by q1, but not by q′2, we can
use q1 and q′2 to get a cheaper Steiner forest. Therefore let eρ be the largest such edge that is
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not paid completely by Player 2. Since the cost shares are maximized for Player 2 and q′2 is the
largest right alternative, there has to be a left alternative for eρ. Let q¯2, defined by µ¯ and ν¯, be a
smallest such alternative. We now show that ν¯ ≤ µ′−1 has to hold, since we get a contradiction
if this is not true:
If ν¯ ≥ µ′ holds, we get that (P1, P2, q1, q¯2, q′2) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2) ((Subcase
PBC6); note that ν¯ < σ since there are no left alternatives for eσ). We have to distinguish
between the two cases q1 big and q1 small. In both cases we get that Subcase PBC6 can not
occur (if q1 is big, see Lemma 16, else see Lemma 19). Therefore ν¯ ≤ µ′ − 1 has to hold, cf.
Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Subcase of R.1.2 (q1 substitutes more commonly used edges than q′2)
If q1 substitutes all commonly used edges or Player 1 pays the edges eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eβ−1 com-
pletely, we get a cheaper solution. Otherwise consider the largest such edge eω that is not paid
completely by Player 1. Since the cost shares are maximized for Player 2, CHANGE(ω, ρ) can not
be feasible and we now analyze why. The changes are feasible for Player 2 because of the choice
of q′2. Therefore they can not be feasible for Player 1 and there is a left alternative for Player 1
that substitutes eω, but not eρ. Let q′1, defined by β
′ and γ′, be such an alternative. If γ′ ≤ β−1
holds, we get a cheaper solution by using q1, q′1, q¯2 and q
′
2. Therefore β ≤ γ
′ ≤ ρ− 1 holds and
(P2, P1, q¯2, q1, q
′
1) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1) (Subcase PBC7). Lemma 19 shows
that this subcase is not possible, completing the case that q1 substitutes more commonly used
edges than q′2.
Therefore q1 substitutes less commonly used edges than q′2. If Player 1 pays the commonly used
edges which are substituted by q′2, but not by q1, we can use q1 and q
′
2 to get a cheaper solution.
Therefore let eρ be the largest such edge that is not paid completely by Player 1 (see Figure 29).
Now CHANGE(ρ, σ) must not be feasible.
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Figure 29: Subcase of R.1.2 (q1 substitutes less commonly used edges than q′2)
Subcase R.1.2.1
Let us first assume that the changes are not feasible for Player 1. Then there has to be a left
alternative for Player 1 which substitutes eρ but not eσ . Let q′1, defined by β
′ and γ′, be a
smallest such alternative. For γ′ ∈ {β, . . . , σ − 1} we get that (P2, P1, q′2, q
′
1, q1) is a PBC for
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(u, v, w, x) = (s2, t2, s1, t1) ((Subcase PBC8); note that µ′ ≥ ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1 holds since there are
no left alternatives for eσ). This is only possible if the costs of the edges eβ , . . . , eγ′ are all zero
(see Lemma 17). Therefore either γ′ ≤ β − 1 holds, or, if this is not true, the costs of the edges
eβ, . . . , eγ′ all have to be zero.
Now if q′2 substitutes all commonly used edges or Player 2 pays the edges eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eµ′−1 we
get a cheaper Steiner forest by using q′1, q1 and q
′
2. Thus let eω be the largest such edge that
is not paid completely by Player 2. Since q′2 is the largest right alternative, there are only left
alternatives for eω. We consider a smallest such alternative q¯2, defined by µ¯ and ν¯. If ν¯ ≤ µ′−1,
we can construct a cheaper Steiner forest by using q′1, q1, q¯2 and q
′
2. Furthermore, ν¯ ≤ σ− 1 has
to hold since there are no left alternatives for eσ. Therefore either ν¯ ∈ {µ′, . . . , γ′ − 1} or ν¯ ∈
{γ′, . . . , σ− 1} holds. In the first case (P1, P2, q′1, q
′
2, q¯2) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2)
(Subcase PBC9). This is only possible if Player 1 pays the edges eν¯+1, . . . , eγ′ completely, see
Lemma 19. Since this is not true for eρ, ν¯ ≥ ρ has to hold. Figure 30 illustrates all remaining
possibilities. As we will see, we can treat all these cases almost analogously.
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(a) First remaining possibility (note: costs of eβ , . . . , eγ′ zero; ν¯ ∈ {ρ, . . . , γ
′ − 1})
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Second remaining possibility (note: ν¯ ∈ {ρ, . . . , γ′ − 1})
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Third remaining possibility (note: costs of eβ, . . . , eγ′ zero; ν¯ ∈ {γ
′, . . . , σ − 1})
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(d) Fourth remaining possibility (note: ν¯ ∈ {γ′, . . . , σ − 1})
Figure 30: Remaining subcases in Subcase R.1.2.1
We now show (for all remaining cases) that the given assignment of cost shares cannot be
maximized for Player 2. To see this, we show that the following changes of cost shares (by
a suitable small amount) preserve the feasibility for LP(F ) (we just say that the changes are
feasible):
Player 1 increases on eρ and decreases on eω and eσ;
Player 2 decreases on eρ and increases on eω and eσ.
Since the sum of cost shares of Player 2 is then higher than before, we get a (final) contradiction
to our assumption that the changes of CHANGE(ρ, σ) are not feasible for Player 1.
It is clear that Player 1 can increase on eρ and decrease on eω and eσ since every (left or right)
alternative that substitutes eρ also substitutes eω or eσ .
The changes of Player 2 are more complicated. First, decreasing on eρ and increasing on eω is
feasible because of our choice of q¯2. Additionally we want to increase on eσ. Assume that this
is not possible. Since q′2 is a largest right alternative and there are no left alternatives for eσ ,
there has to be a right alternative which substitutes eσ, but not eρ. Let q̂2, defined by µ̂ and
ν̂, be a largest such alternative. If ρ+ 1 ≤ µ̂ ≤ β we get a cheaper solution by using q1 and q̂2
since Player 1 pays the edges eρ+1, . . . , eβ−1. We now have to distinguish between the different
cases of Figure 30.
We start with Figures 30a and 30b. In fact we can restrict to the case of Figure 30b. It is quite
clear that the case of Figure 30a can be treated almost analogously, just imagine to contract
the edges eβ , . . . , eγ′ (all those edges have cost zero), and this yields the case of Figure 30b (for
γ′ = β − 1). Therefore consider the case of Figure 30b.
If Player 2 pays the edges eβ , . . . , eµ̂−1, we get a cheaper solution by using q1 and q̂2. Therefore
let eσ′ be the largest edge of eβ, . . . , eµ̂−1 that is not completely paid by Player 2. If the described
changes of cost shares are feasible for σ′ instead of σ, we redefine σ by σ′ and get that the changes
are feasible. In the other case there either has to be a right alternative which substitutes eσ′ ,
but not eρ, a right alternative which substitutes eω or a left alternative which substitutes eσ′ .
Since the first two cases yield contradictions to the choice of q̂2 and q′2, the third case has to be
true. Let q˜2, defined by µ˜ and ν˜, be a left alternative which substitutes eσ′ . Note that q˜2 does
not substitute eσ since there are no left alternatives for this edge. If ν˜ ≤ µ̂−1, we can construct
a cheaper Steiner Forest by using q′1, q1, q˜2 and q̂2. Thus (P1, P2, q1, q˜2, q̂2) has to be a PBC for
(u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2) (Subcase PBC10). Lemma 19 shows that the Subcase PBC10 can
not occur. Therefore the changes of Player 2 are also feasible (perhaps for a slightly changed σ)
for the situations of Figure 30a and Figure 30b.
Now consider the situations of Figures 30c and 30d. As above it is quite clear that Figure 30c
can be treated very similar to Figure 30d, therefore we only consider the latter case.
For the situation displayed in Figure 30d we first consider the case µ̂ ∈ {β + 1, . . . , ν¯}. We get
that (P1, P2, q1, q¯2, q̂2) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2) (Subcase PBC11). By Lemma 19
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we get that µ̂ ≥ ν¯ + 1 has to hold, because Subcase PBC11 is not possible. If Player 2 pays
the edges eν¯+1, . . . , eµ̂−1 we use q′1, q1, q¯2 and q̂2 to construct a cheaper solution. Therefore let
eσ′ be the largest edge of eν¯+1, . . . , eµ̂−1 that is not completely paid by Player 2. If the changes
are feasible for σ′ instead of σ, we redefine σ by σ′ and get that the changes are feasible. In
the other case we get a contradiction. We omit the proof since it is analogous to the proof for
the case of Figure 30c. This shows that the changes of Player 2 are also feasible (perhaps for a
slightly changed σ) for the situations of Figure 30c and Figure 30d.
Subcase R.1.2.2
Overall we showed now that the changes of CHANGE(ρ, σ) are feasible for Player 1. Therefore
they can not be feasible for Player 2. Then there has to be a right alternative that substitutes
eσ, but not eρ; let us consider a largest such alternative q¯2, defined by µ¯ and ν¯. Obviously,
ρ + 1 ≤ µ¯ ≤ σ. The case β < µ¯ is illustrated in Figure 31. In this case we can use q1 and
q¯2 to get a cheaper solution if Player 2 pays the edges eβ , . . . , eµ¯−1. Otherwise consider such
an edge eω which is not paid completely by Player 2. But then we get a contradiction since
CHANGE(ρ, ω) is feasible (feasible for Player 2 because of our choice of q¯2; for Player 1 because of
the feasibility of CHANGE(ρ, σ)). Therefore µ¯ ≤ β has to hold. Now use q¯2 and q1 to construct a
cheaper Steiner forest (note that Player 1 pays the edges eρ+1, . . . , eβ−1).
This completes our analysis of Subcase R.1 since we showed that this case can not occur.
s1
s2
t1
t2
µ′ ρ β µ¯ σ µ α
e
γ
ν
ν ′ = ν¯q¯2
q2
q′2
q1
Figure 31: Subcase R.1.2.2 (note that the order of ν, ν ′ and ν¯ is not relevant, therefore we have
chosen ν ′ = ν¯ for simplification)
Subcase R.2
Now we analyze Subcase R.2 (q2 smallest right alternative for eα and µ ≤ β−1). If q1 substitutes
all commonly used edges or Player 1 pays all edges of the commonly used path which are
substituted by q2, but not by q1, using q1 and q2 yields a cheaper solution. Thus let eσ be the
largest such edge which Player 1 does not pay completely. Figure 32 illustrates the situation for
q2 small.
s1
s2
t1
t2
µ σ β α
γ
ν
e
q1
q2
Figure 32: Subcase R.2 for q2 small
We have to analyze why CHANGE(σ, α) is not feasible. It it clear that the changes are feasible
for Player 2 because of our choice of q2. Therefore the changes can not be feasible for Player 1,
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thus there has to be a left alternative for Player 1 which substitutes eσ, but not eα. We consider
a smallest such alternative q′1 (defined by β
′ and γ′). If γ′ ≥ β holds, (P2, P1, q2, q′1, q1) is a PBC
for (u, v, w, x) = (s2, t2, s1, t1) (Subcase PBC12). We have to distinguish if q2 is small or big. In
both cases we get that Subcase PBC12 is not possible (the case where q2 is small is discussed in
Lemma 18, the case q2 big in Lemma 19). Therefore σ ≤ γ′ ≤ β − 1 has to hold, see Figure 33
(for q2 small).
s1
s2
t1
t2
β′
µ σ γ′ β α
γ
ν
e
q′1 q1
q2
Figure 33: Subcase of R.2 for q2 small
Now let q′2 be a largest right alternative for Player 2. If q
′
2 substitutes all commonly used edges or
Player 2 pays all commonly used edges which are not substituted by q′2, we get a cheaper Steiner
forest by using q1, q′1 and q
′
2 (note that Player 1 pays the edges eγ′+1, . . . , eβ−1). Therefore let
eτ be the largest edge in {ℓ1+ ℓ2+1, . . . , µ′− 1} which Player 2 does not pay completely. Since
the cost shares are maximized for Player 2 there has to be a tight alternative for Player 2 which
substitutes eτ . Since q′2 is the largest right alternative, this has to be a left alternative. Let q¯2,
defined by µ¯ and ν¯, be a smallest such alternative. If ν¯ ≤ µ′−1 holds, we can construct a cheaper
solution by using q′1, q1, q
′
2 and q¯2 since Player 2 pays the edges eτ+1, . . . , eµ′−1 by the choice of
τ . For ν¯ ≥ α we also get a cheaper solution since Player 2 pays the edges eα+1, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2+m.
Therefore ν¯ ∈ {µ′, . . . , α− 1} holds. For µ′ ≤ ν¯ ≤ σ − 1 we get that (P1, P2, q′1, q
′
2, q¯2) is a PBC
for (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2) (Subcase PBC13) We get that this subcase is not possible (see
Lemma 19), therefore σ ≤ ν¯ ≤ α − 1 is the only remaining possibility, see Figure 34 where we
have illustrated the situation for ν¯ ≤ γ′. Now we simultaneously change the cost shares (by a
suitably small amount) as described below to get a contradiction to the assumption that the
cost shares are maximized for Player 2.
Player 1 increases on eσ and decreases on eα and eτ :
Player 2 decreases on eσ and increases on eα and eτ .
It is clear that Player 1 can increase on eσ and decrease on eα and eτ since every alternative
that substitutes eσ also substitutes eα or eτ . It is also clear that Player 2 can decrease on eσ
and increase on eτ since q¯2 is a smallest left alternative for eτ . Additionally increasing on eα is
also possible: There can not be a right alternative which substitutes eα, but not eσ (note that
q2 also substitutes eσ); there can not be a right alternative which substitutes eτ because q′2 is
the largest right alternative and a left alternative which substitutes eα would lead to a cheaper
Steiner forest (together with q′1 and q1).
s1
s2
t1
t2
β′
τ µ′
µ¯
σ ν¯ γ′ β α
e
γ
ν ′
q′1 q1
q′2
q¯2
Figure 34: Remaining possibility for Subcase R.2 (γ′ < ν¯ also possible)
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This completes the proof of Subcase R.2 since we showed that this case can not occur.
Subcase R.3
In Subcase R.3, we assume that ℓ1 + 1 ≤ µ ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 and ν ≤ ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m (remember that q2 is
a tight left alternative which substitutes eα and there are no tight right alternatives for eα), see
Figure 35.
s1
s2
t1
t2
σ αβ ν
e
γ
µ
q1
q2
Figure 35: Subcase R.3
As Player 2 pays the edges eα+1, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2+m completely, we get a cheaper solution if q1 substi-
tutes all commonly used edges or Player 1 pays the edges eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eβ−1 completely. Thus
let eσ be the largest of these edges that Player 1 does not pay completely. We now analyze
why CHANGE(σ, α) is not feasible. The changes for Player 2 are feasible since there is no right
alternative for eα. Therefore, the changes of Player 1 must not be feasible. Thus there has to
be a tight left alternative for Player 1 which substitutes eσ , but not eα. Let q′1, defined by β
′
and γ′, be a smallest such one. If γ′ ≤ β − 1, we get a cheaper Steiner forest by using q′1, q1
and q2 because Player 1 pays the edges eσ+1, . . . , eβ−1 completely. Therefore β ≤ γ′ ≤ α − 1
has to hold and (P2, P1, q2, q1, q′1) is a PBC for (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1) (Subcase PBC14).
Lemma 19 shows that this is also not possible, completing the whole proof of Proposition 5.
A.2.4. Analysis of constructed PBCs
The rest of the paper analyzes the PBCs which we constructed in the proof of Proposition 5.
Since we excluded the existence of BCs, these subgraphs cannot be BCs. We first define twelve
types of PBCs which are no BCs (called NBCs, see Definition 8) and show that each PBC has
to be an NBC if we exclude the existence of BCs (see Lemma 2). Then we derive properties for
each type of NBC (see Lemma 3 - Lemma 14) which are finally used to get contradictions to
the properties of the PBCs constructed in Proposition 5 (see Lemma 15 - Lemma 19).
Using the definition of a PBC, we first give an exact definition of Bad Configurations. To this
aim it is useful to consider the paths q1, q2 and q3 as directed paths. For q1, we choose the
direction as follows: If we consider Pu as directed from u to v, the first node of this directed
path which is contained in q1 is the start node of q1. Considering Figure 23 this means that the
start node of q1 is the left node of the two endnodes of q1. Therefore we refer to this direction
as “directed from left to right” and write ~q1 for this directed version of q1. The directed versions
~q2 and ~q3 of q2 and q3 are chosen analogously by considering Pℓ as directed from w to x.
Furthermore we need to subdivide the paths q1, q2 and q3 in subpaths. In terms of notation we
will always use αi for subpaths of q1, βi for subpaths of q2 and γi for q3. The (directed) subpaths
of ~q1, ~q2 and ~q3 are written as ~αi, ~βi and ~γi.
Definition 7. We call a PBC (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) a BCi for an i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, if the properties of
BCi (described below) are fulfilled. Note that some of the BCis have different subtypes which
are described and illustrated in the corresponding figures.
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BC1:
• q1, q2 and q3 are pairwise node-disjoint;
• q1, q2 and q3 are internal node-disjoint with Pu ∪ Pℓ.
u
w
v
x
q1
q2
q3
BC1a (q1 small)
u
w
v
x
q1
q2 q3
BC1b (q1 big)
Figure 36: BC1a and b
BC2:
• q3 is node-disjoint with q1 and with q2;
• q1 and q2 are not node-disjoint and α2 = β2, where α2 (β2) is the subpath of ~q1 (~q2) from the
first until the last node which is contained in q2 (q1);
• q1, q2 and q3 are internal node-disjoint with Pu ∪ Pℓ.
u
w
v
x
α2 α3α1 β3
β1
q3
BC2a (q1 small, ~α2 = ~β2)
u
w
v
x
α1
α2 α3
β3
β1
q3
BC2b (q1 small, ~α2 6= ~β2)
u
w
v
x
α2 α3α1
β3
β1
q3
BC2c (q1 big, ~α2 = ~β2)
u
w
v
x
α1
α2 α3
β3
β1
q3
BC2d (q1 big, ~α2 6= ~β2)
Figure 37: BC2a, b, c and d
BC3:
• q1 small and substitutes all commonly used edges;
• q1, q2 and q3 are pairwise node-disjoint;
• q2 and q3 do not contain nodes of Ru or Lu;
• q1 does not contain nodes of Rℓ;
• q1 contains nodes of Lℓ, but not the start node of ~q2, and α1 ⊆ C2, where α1 is the subpath
of ~q1 beginning with the start node of ~q1 and ending with the last node which is contained in
Lℓ.
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Figure 38: BC3
BC4:
• q1 small and substitutes all commonly used edges;
• q3 is node-disjoint with q1 and with q2;
• q1 and q2 are not node-disjoint and α3 = β2, where α3 (β2) is the subpath of ~q1 (~q2) from the
first until the last node which is contained in q2 (q1);
• q2 and q3 do not contain nodes of Ru or Lu;
• q1 does not contain nodes of Rℓ;
• q1 contains nodes of Lℓ, but not the start node of ~q2, and α1 ⊆ C2, where α1 is the subpath
of ~q1 beginning with the start node of ~q1 and ending with the last node which is contained in
Lℓ.
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x
α3 α4
β3
α1
α2
β1
q3
BC4a ( ~α3 = ~β2)
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α3 α4
β3
α1
α2
β1
q3
BC4b ( ~α3 6= ~β2)
Figure 39: BC4a and b
In the following definition, we group PBCs which are no BCs into twelve “types”.
Definition 8. We call a PBC (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) a NBCi for an i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 12}, if the properties
of NBCi (described below) are fulfilled. Note that some of the NBCis have different subtypes,
which are described and illustrated in the corresponding figures.
NBC1: q1 is small and q1 and q3 are not node-disjoint
NBC2: q2 and q3 are not node-disjoint
u
w
v
x
q2
γ1
α2
α1 γ2
NBC1
u
w
v
x
β1 γ1
γ2 β2
NBC2
Figure 40: NBC1 and 2
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NBC3: q2 contains a node of Lu or Ru
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v
x
q1β2
β1
q3
NBC3a (q1 small, q2 contains a node of Lu)
u
w
v
x
q1
β2
q3
β1
NBC3b (q1 small, q2 contains a node of Ru which is not
substituted by q1)
u
w
v
x
q1
β2
q3
β1
NBC3c (q1 small, q2 contains a node of Ru which is substituted by q1)
u
w
v
x
q1
β2
q3
β1
NBC3d (q1 big, q2 contains a node of Lu which
is not substituted by q1)
u
w
v
x
q1
β2
q3
β1
NBC3e (q1 big, q2 contains a node of Lu which
is substituted by q1)
u
w
v
x
q1
q3β1
β2
NBC3f (q1 big, q2 contains a node of Ru which
is not substituted by q1)
u
w
v
x
q1
q3β1
β2
NBC3g (q1 big, q2 contains a node of Ru which
is substituted by q1)
Figure 41: NBC3a, b, c, d, e, f and g
NBC4: q3 contains a node of Lu or Ru
u
w
v
x
q1
q2
γ2
γ1
NBC4a (q1 small, q3 contains a node of Lu)
u
w
v
x
q2
q1 γ2
γ1
NBC4b (q1 small, q3 contains a node of Ru which is not
substituted by q1)
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NBC4c (q1 small, q3 contains a node of Ru which is substituted by q1)
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NBC4d (q1 big, q3 contains a node of Lu which
is not substituted by q1)
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q2
γ2
γ1
NBC4e (q1 big, q3 contains a node of Lu which
is substituted by q1)
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q2
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γ1
NBC4f (q1 big, q3 contains a node of Ru which
is not substituted by q1)
u
w
v
x
q2
q1
γ2
γ1
NBC4g (q1 big, q3 contains a node of Ru which
is substituted by q1)
Figure 42: NBC4a, b, c, d, e, f and g
NBC5: q1 contains a node of Lℓ and a node of Rℓ
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NBC5a (q1 small, ~q1 contains first a node of Lℓ)
u
w
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x
α1
α3
α2
NBC5b (q1 small, ~q1 contains first a node of Rℓ)
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α1 α3
α2
NBC5c (q1 big, ~q1 contains first a node of Lℓ)
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v
x
α3
α1
α2
NBC5d (q1 big, ~q1 contains first a node of Rℓ)
Figure 43: NBC5a, b, c and d
NBC6: q1 is small and contains a node of Rℓ
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α2
α1
q2
q3
NBC6a (node of Rℓ which is not substituted by q3)
u
w
v
x
α2
α1
q2 q3
NBC6b (node of Rℓ which is substituted by q3)
Figure 44: NBC6a and b
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NBC7: q1 is big and contains a node of Rℓ which is not substituted by q3
u
w
v
x
α2
α1
q2 q3
Figure 45: NBC7
NBC8: q1 is big and either
• q1 is not node-disjoint with q2 and contains a node of Rℓ which is substituted by q3, or
• q1 is not node-disjoint with q3 and contains a node of Lℓ which is substituted by q2
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NBC8a (q2, Rℓ, ~q1 contains first a node of q2)
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NBC8b (q2, Rℓ, ~q1 contains first a node of Rℓ)
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NBC8c (q3, Lℓ, ~q1 contains first a node of q3)
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NBC8d (q3, Lℓ, ~q1 contains first a node of Lℓ)
Figure 46: NBC8a, b, c and d
NBC9: q1 contains a node of Lℓ which is not substituted by q2
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q2 q3
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NBC9a (q1 small)
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q2 q3
α1
NBC9b (q1 big)
Figure 47: NBC9a and b
NBC10: q1 is small and ~q1 contains a node of Lℓ which is substituted by q2 after a node of q2
u
w
v
x
β1 α2
α3
q3
α1 β2
Figure 48: NBC10
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NBC11: q1 is big and either
• ~q1 contains a node of Lℓ which is substituted by q2 after a node of q2 or
• ~q1 contains a node of q3 after a node of Rℓ which is substituted by q3
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β1
NBC11a (q2, Lℓ)
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γ2
α1
q2
α3
α2
γ1
NBC11b (Rℓ, q3)
Figure 49: NBC11a and b
NBC12: q1 is big, not node-disjoint with q2 and not node-disjoint with q3
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NBC12a (~q1 first contains a node of q2)
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NBC12b (~q1 first contains a node of q3)
Figure 50: NBC12a and b
The following lemma shows that the PBCs constructed in the proof of Proposition 5 have to be
NBCs.
Lemma 2. If (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) does not contain a BC, then each PBC has to be a NBC.
Proof. Let us assume (by contradiction) that (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) does not contain a BC and
(Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is a PBC, but no NBC.
The following properties are closely related to the properties defining the different types of BCs
and NBCs. By investigating which of these properties are fulfilled, we construct a contradiction.
(P1) q1 small;
(P2) q1 big;
(P3) q1 node-disjoint with q2;
(P4) q1 node-disjoint with q3;
(P5) q2 node-disjoint with q3;
(P6) q1 contains nodes of Lℓ or Rℓ;
(P7) q2 contains nodes of Lu or Ru;
(P8) q3 contains nodes of Lu or Ru.
Since (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is no NBC, the property (P5) has to hold (no NBC2), whereas (P7) and
(P8) are not fulfilled (no NBC3 and 4). According to (P6) we get that q1 does not contain a
node of Lℓ and a node of Rℓ (no NBC5).
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We first assume that (P1) is fulfilled (thus (P2) not) and show that we get a contradiction in this
case. Since (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is no NBC1, (P4) holds. Regarding (P6) we get that q1 does not
contain a node of Rℓ (no NBC6) and no node of Lℓ which is not substituted by q2 (no NBC9).
What remains according to (P6) is if the following property holds:
(P6’) q1 does not contain a node of Lℓ which is substituted by q2.
Furthermore we have not investigated if (P3) is fulfilled. Since (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) cannot be a
BC1, at least one of the properties (P3) and (P6’) does not hold. Assume that (P3) does not
hold, but (P6’) is true. As we will see, this cannot happen since we excluded the existence of a
BC2. To this aim let us subdivide q1 from left to right into α1, α2, α3, where α2 is the subpath
from the first node va to the last node vb of q1 which is contained in q2. Furthermore, let β
be the subpath of q2 from va to vb. But now either α2 = β holds, thus (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is a
BC2, or (Pu, Pℓ, q′1, q2, q3) is a BC2, where q
′
1 is generated by using β instead of α2 in q1. The
argumentation is very similar for the case that (P3) holds, but not (P6’): Let va be the last node
of q1 which is contained in Lℓ and vb the first node of the commonly used path (considering it
from left to right). Furthermore, α1 is the subpath of q1 beginning with the start node of q1 and
ending with va, and ℓ is the subpath of Lℓ from vb to va. Now either (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is a BC3,
or we get a BC3 by using ℓ instead of α1 in q1. The only remaining case is that both properties
are violated. Since (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is no NBC10, we can subdivide q1 from left to right into
α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, where α2 is the subpath between the first node va and the last node vb of
q1 which is contained in Lℓ and α4 is the subpath between the first node vc and the last node
vd of q1 which is contained in q2. Furthermore let ve be the first node of the commonly used
path. But now we again get a contradiction since we can show that there is a BC4: Let ℓ be the
subpath of Lℓ from ve to vb and β the subpath of q2 from vc to vd. Now either (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3)
is a BC4 or we get a BC4 by using ℓ instead of α1 and α2, and β instead of α4 in q1.
This shows that (P1) cannot hold and therefore (P2) has to be fulfilled. Since (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3)
is no NBC7 and no NBC9, q1 does not contain a node of Rℓ which is not substituted by q3, and
not a node of Lℓ which is not substituted by q2. It remains to investigate if (P3), (P4), (P6’)
and the following property (P6”) hold:
(P6”) q1 does not contain a node of Rℓ which is substituted by q3.
Since (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) cannot be a BC1, at least one of these properties does not hold. Also note
that at most one of the properties (P3) and (P4) can be violated (no NBC12), and also at most
one of (P6’) and (P6”) (no NBC5). Therefore at most two properties can be violated. Let us first
consider the case that exactly one of these properties is violated: If this is (P3) or (P4), we get a
contradiction since there is no BC2 (either (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) or (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q3, q2) is a BC2, or we
can change q1 to q′1 (as in the case of q1 small) and get that (Pu, Pℓ, q
′
1, q2, q3) or (Pu, Pℓ, q
′
1, q3, q2)
is a BC2). If (P6’) or (P6”) does not hold, we also get contradictions since there is no BC3 (by
a suitable change of q1 to q′1, we get that either (Pu, Pℓ, q
′
1, q2, q3) or (Pu, Pℓ, q
′
1, q3, q2) is a BC3).
Now we consider the case that two properties are violated: First assume that q1 is not node-
disjoint with q2 (i.e. (P4) is true, (P3) not). Since (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is no NBC8, (P6”) has
to be true, whereas (P6’) is violated. Furthermore (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is no NBC11, thus we can
subdivide q1 from left to right into α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, where α2 is the subpath between the first
and the last node of q1 which is contained in Lℓ and α4 is the subpath between the first and the
last node of q1 which is contained in q2. But now we get a contradiction, since we get a BC4 by
a suitable change of q1 (as for q1 small). Therefore (P3) has to hold, whereas (P4) is violated.
As (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is no NBC8, (P6’) has to be true and (P6”) is violated. Furthermore (no
NBC11) we can subdivide q1 from left to right into α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, where α2 is the subpath
between the first and the last node of q1 which is contained in q3 and α4 is the subpath between
the first and the last node of q1 which is contained in Rℓ. But now we get a contradiction, since
(Pu, Pℓ, q
′
1, q3, q2) is a BC4 for a suitable change of q1 to q
′
1 (as for q1 small).
This shows that our initial assumption, that (Pu, Pℓ, q1, q2, q3) is no NBC, cannot be true.
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Next we derive some properties of the NBCs which we use in Lemma 15 - Lemma 19 to analyze
the PBCs constructed in the proof of Proposition 5. In view of the proof of Proposition 5 it is
reasonable to assume that Pu∪Pℓ = F and q1, q2 and q3 are tight alternatives. In particular, all
commonly used edges are completely paid, and e is either in Lu∪Lℓ or in Ru∪Rℓ. Furthermore
we denote the player who corresponds to the source-sink-pair (u, v) as the upper Player and the
other one as the lower Player, and their cost shares by ξu,. and ξℓ,., respectively. To simplify
notation, we use the displayed path labels for the paths itself, but also for the costs of the
corresponding paths. Additionally we just write ξi,p for the sum of cost shares that Player i
pays on the edges of a path p.
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Figure 51: NBC1
Lemma 3. For NBC1 (cf. Figure 51), we get the following properties:
i) All edges which are substituted by q1 or by q3 are completely paid.
ii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s1, t1, s2, t2), (t1, s1, t2, s2)}, Player 1 pays all edges of the commonly
used path which are substituted by q1, but not by q3 (a).
iii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s2, t2, s1, t1), (t2, s2, t1, s1)}, Player 2 pays all edges of the commonly
used path which are substituted by q1, but not by q3 (a).
Proof. Since q1 is a tight alternative for the upper player and q3 is a tight alternative for the
lower player, we get
α1 + α2 = ξu,a + ξu,b + ξu,c + ξu,d and γ1 + γ2 = ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,f .
Adding these equalities yields
α1 + α2 + γ1 + γ2 = ξu,a + b+ c+ ξu,d + ξℓ,f .
Since Pu ∪ Pℓ is an optimal Steiner forest and adding α1, α2 and γ1, while deleting a, b, c, d and
f , yields another Steiner forest, α1 +α2 + γ1 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ f has to hold. Altogether we get
that ξu,a + ξu,d + ξℓ,f ≥ a+ d+ f and therefore ξu,a = a, ξu,d = d and ξℓ,f = f holds.
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Figure 52: NBC2
Lemma 4. For NBC2 (cf. Figure 52), we get the following properties:
i) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s1, t1, s2, t2), (t1, s1, t2, s2)}, there is a tight alternative for Player 2
which substitutes all edges of P2 which are substituted by q2 or q3 (in particular all commonly
used edges). Furthermore, Player 2 pays all edges of the commonly used path which are
substituted by q2 and q3 (c).
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ii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s2, t2, s1, t1), (t2, s2, t1, s1)}, there is a tight alternative for Player 1
which substitutes all edges of P1 which are substituted by q2 or q3 (in particular all commonly
used edges). Furthermore, Player 1 pays all edges of the commonly used path which are
substituted by q2 and q3 (c).
Proof. Since q2 and q3 are tight alternatives for the lower player we get
β1 + β2 = ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c and γ1 + γ2 = ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f .
Adding these two equalities yields
β1 + β2 + γ1 + γ2 = ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + 2ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f .
Furthermore there is an alternative q for the lower Player which substitutes a, b, c, d and f
(contained in the union of the paths β1 and γ1) and therefore
β1 + γ1 ≥ c(q) ≥ ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f
holds, where c(q) denotes the cost of the alternative q. Using this we get
ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + 2ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f = β1 + β2 + γ1 + γ2 ≥ ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f + β2 + γ2
and thus ξℓ,c ≥ β2 + γ2 holds. On the other hand, ξℓ,c ≤ c ≤ γ2 + β2, since adding γ2 and β2
while deleting c also yields a Steiner forest. This implies ξℓ,c = c = γ2 + β2. Furthermore we
get that q is a tight alternative since ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + 2ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d+ ξℓ,f = β1 + γ1 + ξℓ,c and therefore
ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f = β1 + γ1 = c(q) holds.
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Figure 53: NBC3
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Lemma 5. For NBC3 (cf. Figure 53) we get the following properties:
i) For NBC3a, NBC3d and NBC3e: All edges which are substituted by q1, q2 or by q3 are
completely paid.
ii) For NBC3a and (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2): Player 2 pays all commonly used edges which
are not substituted by q1 (c).
iii) For NBC3b, NBC3c, NBC3f and NBC3g:
• For (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2), Player 2 has a tight left alternative which substitutes all
commonly used edges.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2), Player 2 has a tight right alternative which substitutes
all commonly used edges.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (s2, t2, s1, t1), Player 2 pays all edges of the commonly used path which
are not substituted by q2 (f).
• For (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1), all edges of the commonly used path which are not sub-
stituted by q2 (f) have cost 0.
Proof. We start with NBC3a. Since q1, q2 and q3 are tight alternatives we get
q1 = ξu,d + ξu,f + ξu,g + ξu,h, β1 + β2 = ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f and q3 = ξℓ,f + ξℓ,g + ξℓ,i
and (by adding)
q1 + β1 + β2 + q3 = ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + d+ f + ξℓ,f + g + ξu,h + ξℓ,i.
Since Pu∪Pℓ is optimal, β1+β2 ≥ a+ b+ c+d+ f and q1+ q3 ≥ f + g+h+ i has to hold. This
implies q1 + β1 + β2 + q3 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+2f + g+ h+ i and therefore ξℓ,b = b, ξℓ,c = c, ξu,h = h
and ξℓ,i = i holds.
Now we consider NBC3d. Adding the tight alternatives q1, q2 and q3 yields
q1 + β1 + β2 + q3 = ξu,b + ξℓ,c + d+ f + ξℓ,f + g + ξu,h + ξℓ,i.
Since Pu ∪ Pℓ is optimal, β1 + β2 ≥ a + b + c + d + f and q1 + q3 ≥ b + f + g + h + i and
therefore q1 + β1 + β2 + q3 ≥ a + 2b + c + d + 2f + g + h + i has to hold. This implies
ξu,b = b = 0, ξℓ,c = c, ξu,h = h and ξℓ,i = i.
We omit the proof for NBC3e since it it almost analogous to the proof for NBC3d.
For NBC3b we get
β1 + β2 = ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d
because q2 is a tight alternative of the lower Player. Since β1 followed by h and g is an alternative
q for the lower Player which substitutes a, b, c, d and f ,
β1 + g + h ≥ ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f
holds. Furthermore we get β2 ≥ g + h because Pu ∪ Pℓ is optimal. Together this implies
ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d = β1 + β2 ≥ ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f
and therefore ξℓ,f = 0, q is tight and β2 = g + h.
We now use β2 ≥ ξu,f + ξu,g+ ξu,h. It is clear that this holds if β2 is an alternative for the upper
Player; if not, the statement is still true (we will prove this below). Therefore we get
g + h = β2 ≥ ξu,f + ξu,g + ξu,h = f + ξu,g + ξu,h
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and, if ξu,g = g and ξu,h = h holds, f = 0.
We now show that β2 ≥ ξu,f + ξu,g + ξu,h always holds. Consider the path β2 and assume that
β2 is not an alternative for the upper player. That means that β2 has to contain at least one
node of Lu or Ru (additionally to the endnode which is already in Ru).
Assume that β2 contains a node of Lu. Considering β2 as directed from left to right, let q be the
subpath of β2 from the last node which is contained in Lu until the next node which is in Ru.
This is an alternative for the upper Player which substitutes a subpath ℓ of Lu, all commonly
used edges and a subpath r of Ru. Subdivide g and h into g1, g2 and h1, h2, where g1 and h1
are the subpaths of g and h which are contained in r (note that g1 = g, h1 = h or h2 = h is
possible). We then get
q ≥ ξu,ℓ + ξu,b + ξu,c + ξu,d + ξu,f + ξu,r ≥ ξu,f + ξu,g1 + ξu,h1.
Furthermore, β2 ≥ q+ g2+h2 has to hold, since the remaining subpath of β2 after q has cost at
least g2 + h2 (Pu ∪ Pℓ is optimal). Together with g2 + h2 ≥ ξu,g2 + ξu,h2 this yields the desired
inequality.
Now assume that β2 does not contain a node of Lu. Again considering β2 as directed from left
to right, let q be the subpath from the beginning of β2 until the first node which is contained in
Ru. This is an alternative for the upper Player which substitutes f , a part g1 of g and a part
h1 of h (again by subdividing g in g1, g2 and h in h1, h2). Using q ≥ ξu,f + ξu,g1 + ξu,h1 and
β2 ≥ q + g2 + h2 yields the desired result in this case as well.
We omit the proofs for NBC3c, NBC3f and NBC3g since they are almost analogous to the proof
for NBC3b.
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Figure 54: NBC4
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Lemma 6. For NBC4 (cf. Figure 54) we get the following properties:
i) For NBC4a:
• All edges which are substituted by q1 or by q3 are completely paid.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2), Player 2 has a tight left alternative which substitutes all
commonly used edges.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1), Player 2 pays all commonly used edges which are not
substituted by q3 (c,d).
ii) For NBC4b:
• All edges which are substituted by q1 or by q3 are completely paid.
• All commonly used edges which are substituted by q3 (b, c) have cost 0.
iii) For NBC4c:
• All edges which are substituted by q3 are completely paid.
• For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s1, t1, s2, t2), (t1, s1, t2, s2)}, Player 2 pays all commonly used edges
which are substituted by q3 (a, b).
• For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s2, t2, s1, t1), (t2, s2, t1, s1)}, Player 1 pays all commonly used edges
which are substituted by q3 (a, b).
iv) For NBC4d and NBC4e:
• For (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2), Player 2 has a tight right alternative which substitutes
all commonly used edges.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (s2, t2, s1, t1), Player 1 has a tight right alternative which substitutes
all commonly used edges.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1), Player 2 pays all edges of the commonly used path which
are not substituted by q3 (d).
v) For NBC4f and NBC4g: All edges which are substituted by q1, q2 or by q3 are completely
paid.
Proof. We start with NBC4a. Since q3 is a tight alternative of the lower player,
γ1 + γ2 = ξℓ,f + ξℓ,g + ξℓ,i
holds. Furthermore, γ1 followed by a is an alternative q for the lower player which substitutes
c, d, f, g and i. This implies
γ1 + a ≥ ξℓ,c + ξℓ,d + ξℓ,f + ξℓ,g + ξℓ,i.
Using γ2 ≥ a (Pu ∪ Pℓ is optimal) yields that q is tight and ξℓ,c = ξℓ,d = 0 holds.
Since q1 is also tight we get
q1 + γ1 + γ2 = d+ f + g + ξu,h + ξℓ,i
and the optimality of Pu ∪ Pℓ implies q1 + γ1 ≥ d+ f + g + h + i. This results in ξu,h = h and
ξℓ,i = i.
For NBC4b we get
ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,g = γ1 + γ2 ≥ b+ c+ d+ f + g
since q3 is tight and Pu ∪ Pℓ is optimal and therefore ξℓ,b = b, ξℓ,c = c, ξu,d = d = 0 and ξℓ,g = g
holds. Furthermore
ξu,a = ξu,a + ξu,b + ξu,c + ξu,d = q1 ≥ a+ b+ c
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and thus b = c = 0 holds.
For NBC4c we use
ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,d = γ1 + γ2 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d
to get ξℓ,a = a, ξℓ,b = b and ξℓ,d = d.
The properties for NBC4d, NBC4e, NBC4f and NBC4g follow from the properties of the corre-
sponding cases of NBC3 (by symmetry).
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Figure 55: NBC5
Lemma 7. For NBC5 (cf. Figure 55) we get the following properties:
i) All edges which are substituted by q1 are completely paid.
ii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s1, t1, s2, t2), (t1, s1, t2, s2)}, all commonly used edges are completely
paid by Player 1.
iii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s2, t2, s1, t1), (t2, s2, t1, s1)}, all commonly used edges are completely
paid by Player 2.
Proof. For NBC5a and NBC5b we get α1+α2+α3 = ξu,c+ξu,d since q1 is tight. The optimality
of Pu ∪ Pℓ implies α2 ≥ b+ c and α3 ≥ d and therefore α2 + α3 ≥ b+ c+ d. Altogether we get
ξu,c = c, ξu,d = d and ξu,b = b = 0.
For NBC5c and NBC5d we use α1 + α2 + α3 = ξu,a + ξu,c + ξu,d, α1 ≥ a, α2 ≥ c and α3 ≥ d to
get ξu,a = a, ξu,c = c and ξu,d = d.
u
w
v
x
a b c
d
f
g
α2
α1
q2
q3
NBC6a
u
w
v
x
a b c
d
f
g
α2
α1
q2 q3
NBC6b
Figure 56: NBC6
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Lemma 8. For NBC6 (cf. Figure 56) we get the following properties:
i) All edges which are substituted by q1 or by q3 are completely paid.
ii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s1, t1, s2, t2), (t1, s1, t2, s2)}, Player 1 pays all commonly used edges
which are substituted by q1 (a, b, c).
iii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s2, t2, s1, t1), (t2, s2, t1, s1)}, Player 2 pays all commonly used edges
which are substituted by q1 (a, b, c).
Proof. We start with NBC6a and get
ξu,a + ξu,b + ξu,c + ξu,d = α1 + α2 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ f + g
since q1 is tight and Pu ∪ Pℓ is optimal. Therefore ξu,a = a, ξu,b = b, ξu,c = c, ξu,d = d and
ξℓ,f = f = 0 holds.
For NBC6b we analogously get that ξu,a = a, ξu,b = b, ξu,c = c, ξu,d = d and ξℓ,f = f = 0 holds.
Together with
ξℓ,g = ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + ξℓ,f + ξℓ,g = q3 ≥ f + g = g
this shows ξℓ,g = g.
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Figure 57: NBC7
Lemma 9. For NBC7 (cf. Figure 57) we get that all edges which are substituted by q1, q2 or by
q3 are completely paid.
Proof. Using that q1, q2 and q3 are tight yields
α1 + α2 + q2 + q3 = ξu,a + ξℓ,b + c+ d+ ξℓ,d + f + ξu,g + ξℓ,h.
The optimality of Pu ∪ Pℓ implies α1 + q2 ≥ a + b + c + d and α2 + q3 ≥ d + f + g + h and
therefore
α1 + α2 + q2 + q3 ≥ a+ b+ c+ 2d+ f + g + h.
Altogether we get ξu,a = a, ξℓ,b = b, ξu,g = g and ξℓ,h = h.
u
w
v
x
a
b
c d f
g
h
i
β2
α3
α1
α2β1
q3
NBC8a
u
w
v
x
a
b
c d f
g
h
i
β2
α3
α1
α2β1
q3
NBC8b
u
w
v
x
a
c
b
d f g
h
i
γ2
α1
α2
α3
γ1
q2
NBC8c
u
w
v
x
a
c
b
d f g
h
i
γ2
α3
α1
α2
γ1
q2
NBC8d
Figure 58: NBC8
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Lemma 10. For NBC8 (cf. Figure 58) we get the following properties:
i) For NBC8a and NBC8b:
• All edges which are substituted by q1 or by q2 are completely paid.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (s2, t2, s1, t1), Player 2 pays all edges of the commonly used path which
are not substituted by q2 (f).
ii) For NBC8c and NBC8d:
• All edges which are substituted by q1 or by q3 are completely paid.
• For (u, v, w, x) = (t2, s2, t1, s1), Player 2 pays all edges of the commonly used path which
are not substituted by q3 (d).
Proof. For NBC8a and NBC8b we get
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 = ξu,a + ξℓ,b + c+ d+ ξu,f + ξu,g
since q1 and q2 are tight alternatives. On the other hand the optimality of Lu ∪ Lℓ implies
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ f + g + h
and therefore ξu,a = a, ξℓ,b = b, ξu,f = f and ξu,g = g holds.
The properties for NBC8c and NBC8d follow by symmetry reasons.
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Figure 59: NBC9
Lemma 11. For NBC9 (cf. Figure 59) we get the following properties:
i) All edges which are substituted by q1, q2 or by q3 are completely paid.
ii) If q1 is small and (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2), we additionally get that Player 2 pays all
edges of the commonly used path which are not substituted by q1 (c).
Proof. For NBC9a we get
α1 + α2 + q2 + q3 = ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + d+ f + ξℓ,f + g + ξu,h + ξℓ,i
since q1, q2 and q3 are tight. On the other hand the optimality of Lu ∪ Lℓ implies α2 + q3 ≥
f + g + h+ i, q2 ≥ c+ d+ f and α1 ≥ a+ b and therefore
α1 + α2 + q2 + q3 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ 2f + g + h+ i.
Altogether we get that ξℓ,b = b, ξℓ,c = c, ξu,h = h and ξℓ,i = i holds.
For NBC9b, the desired properties follow from the properties of NBC7 (by symmetry).
48
uw
v
xa
b
c d f g
h
i
β1 α2
α3
q3
α1 β2
Figure 60: NBC10
Lemma 12. For NBC10 (cf. Figure 60) we get the following properties:
i) All edges which are substituted by q1, q2 or by q3 are completely paid.
ii) For (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2), Player 2 pays all edges of the commonly used path which
are not substituted by q1 (c).
Proof. Using that q1, q2 and q3 are tight we get
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 + q3 = ξℓ,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + d+ f + ξℓ,f + g + ξu,h + ξℓ,i.
The optimality of Lu∪Lℓ yields α1+β1 ≥ a+ b, α2+β2 ≥ c+ d+ f and α3+ q3 ≥ f + g+h+ i
and therefore
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 + q3 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ 2f + g + h+ i.
This results in ξℓ,a = a, ξℓ,b = b, ξℓ,c = c, ξu,h = h and ξℓ,i = i.
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Figure 61: NBC11
Lemma 13. For NBC11 (cf. Figure 61) we get that all edges which are substituted by q1, q2 or
by q3 are completely paid.
Proof. For NBC11a, we get
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 + q3 = ξu,a + ξℓ,b + ξℓ,c + d+ f + ξℓ,f + g + ξu,h + ξℓ,i
by using that q1, q2 and q3 are tight. On the other hand the optimality of Lu ∪ Lℓ implies
α3 + q3 ≥ f + g + h+ i and α1 + β1 + β2 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ f and therefore
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 + q3 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ 2f + g + h+ i.
This yields ξu,a = a, ξℓ,b = b, ξℓ,c = c, ξu,h = h and ξℓ,i = i.
The properties for NBC11b follow analogously (by symmetry).
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Figure 62: NBC12
Lemma 14. For NBC12 (cf. Figure 62) we get the following properties:
i) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s1, t1, s2, t2), (t1, s1, t2, s2)} and q1, q2 or q3 substitutes an edge which is
not completely paid, Player 2 has a positive cost share for an edge of the commonly used
path which is substituted by q2 and by q3 (d).
ii) For (u, v, w, x) ∈ {(s2, t2, s1, t1), (t2, s2, t1, s1)} and q1, q2 or q3 substitutes an edge which is
not completely paid, Player 1 has a positive cost share for an edge of the commonly used
path which is substituted by q2 and by q3 (d).
Proof. We first show that NBC12a is not possible if ξu,a+ ξℓ,b+ ξu,g+ ξℓ,h < a+ b+ g+h holds:
Since q1, q2 and q3 are tight, we get
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 + γ1 + γ2 = ξu,a + ξℓ,b + c+ d+ ξℓ,d + f + ξu,g + ξℓ,h.
Since Pu∪Pℓ is an optimal Steiner forest, we get α1+β1+β2 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d and α3+ γ1+ γ2 ≥
d+ f + g + h and together
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 + γ1 + γ2 ≥ a+ b+ c+ 2d+ f + g + h.
This shows that ξu,a = a, ξℓ,b = b, ξu,g = g and ξℓ,h = h has to hold, a contradiction to our
assumption.
Now consider NBC12b. Using that the alternatives are tight yields as above
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + β2 + γ1 + γ2 = ξu,a + ξℓ,b + c+ d+ ξℓ,d + f + ξu,g + ξℓ,h
and the optimality of Pu ∪ Pℓ implies
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1 + γ1 ≥ a+ b+ c+ d+ f + g + h.
Therefore ξℓ,d ≥ a+ b+ g + h− (ξu,a + ξℓ,b + ξu,g + ξℓ,h) > 0 has to hold.
Next we have to show that our statements according to PBCs in the proof of Proposition 5
are correct. We will discuss the most involved occurrences of PBCs in detail. We can always
assume that we are analyzing NBCs, since we excluded the existence of BCs in the proof of
Proposition 5.
Lemma 15 (PBC1). Assume that (P1, P2, q1, q′′2 , q2) is a NBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2)
with the properties of PBC1, i.e.
• q1 (defined by β, γ) smallest right alternative of Player 1 for e;
• q1 big;
• eα largest edge in {ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1, . . . , ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• q2 (defined by µ, ν) smallest right alternative of Player 2 for eα;
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• eσ largest edge in {ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1, . . . , µ − 1} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• q′2 (defined by µ
′, ν ′) largest left alternative of Player 2 for eσ;
• µ ≤ ν ′ ≤ α− 1;
• q′′2 , defined by µ
′′ and ν ′′, smallest left alternative for Player 2 which substitutes eσ;
• µ ≤ ν ′′ ≤ α− 1;
see Figure 63 for illustration. This leads to contradictions for all possible types of NBCs.
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Figure 63: PBC1 (µ′′ ≤ µ′ also possible)
Proof. We get the following contradictions:
Type of NBC contradiction
1, 3a-c, 4a-c, 6, 10 not possible since q1 is big
2, 3f, 3g, 4d, 4e cheaper Steiner forest (q1 and tight alternative for Player 2)
3d, 3e, 4f, 4g, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11 e is completely paid
For NBC12, we do not get a contradiction directly. We only get that there has to be an edge eτ
in {eµ, . . . , eν′′} which is not completely paid by Player 1.
Since the given cost shares are an an optimal solution for LP(F ), the following changes of the
cost shares (by a suitably small amount) can not yield a feasible solution for LP(F ) (the sum
of all collected cost shares would be higher than before):
Player 2 increases on eσ and eα and decreases on eτ ,
Player 1 increases on eτ and e and decreases on eσ and eα.
}
(∗)
Therefore we now analyze which of these changes preserve the feasibility for LP(F ) (we simply
say that the changes are feasible), and which not.
The changes for Player 1 are obviously feasible since q1 is the smallest right alternative for e. For
Player 2, increasing on eα while decreasing on eτ is also feasible (q2 smallest right alternative for
eα), therefore additionally increasing on eσ can not be feasible. Either there is a left alternative
which substitutes eσ but not eτ (which is a contradiction to our choice of q′′2), there is a left
alternative which substitutes eσ, eτ and eα (which is a contradiction to the optimality of the
Steiner forest) or there is a right alternative which substitutes eσ, eτ and eα. In the following,
we change the cost shares iteratively to achieve that there is no such alternative, i.e. no right
alternative for eσ, meanwhile no alternatives get tight during the process, q1 (q2) remains the
smallest right alternative for e (eα) and the cost shares of all edges with order larger or equal
than σ stay unchanged. Furthermore, all left alternatives of the second player remain tight.
Altogether we achieve that changing the cost shares as described in (∗) is then feasible and this
is a contradiction to the optimality of the cost shares.
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Now we describe how to change the cost shares iteratively. Let q¯2 be the largest right al-
ternative for Player 2. If q¯2 substitutes all commonly used edges or Player 2 pays the edges
eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eµ¯−1 we get a cheaper solution. Therefore let eρ be the largest such edge which
Player 2 does not pay completely. Since the cost shares are maximized for Player 2 there is an
alternative for this edge and this has to be a left one because of our choice of q¯2. We consider
the smallest such alternative q̂2, defined by µ̂ and ν̂. Note that ν̂ ≤ ν ′′ holds since q′′2 is a left
alternative for eρ. If ν̂ ≤ µ¯− 1 holds, we can construct a cheaper Steiner forest. For σ ≤ ν̂ (i.e.
ν̂ = ν ′′ because of the choice of q′′2), the changes described in (∗) would be feasible for ρ instead
of σ. Therefore µ¯ ≤ ν̂ ≤ σ − 1 has to hold, see Figure 64.
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Figure 64: NBC12 in Lemma 15
But now, (P1, P2, q1, q̂2, q¯2) is again a NBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s1, t1, s2, t2) and (analogous as
before) there has to be an edge eω in {µ¯, . . . , ν̂} which Player 1 does not pay completely. Now it
is feasible that Player 1 decreases her cost share on eρ and increases on eω (because of our choice
of q1) and that Player 2 decreases on eω and increases on eρ (by the choice of q̂2). Note that we
can ensure that no alternatives get tight by changing the cost shares by a suitably small amount.
Furthermore, q¯2 is not tight anymore (but q1, q2 and all tight left alternatives for the second
player obviously stay tight). If there is no right alternative for eσ which is tight according to the
changed cost shares, we can stop the procedure. If not, redefine q¯2 as a largest such alternative
and repeat the procedure above. This shows that NBC12 also leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 16 (PBC6, in the case q1 big). Assume that (P1, P2, q1, q¯2, q′2) is a NBC for (u, v, w, x) =
(s1, t1, s2, t2) with the properties of PBC6 and q1 big, i.e.
• q1 (defined by β, γ) smallest right alternative of Player 1 for e;
• q1 big;
• eα largest edge in {ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1, . . . , ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• q2 (defined by µ, ν) smallest right alternative of Player 2 for eα;
• eσ largest edge in {ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1, . . . , µ − 1} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• only right alternatives of Player 2 for eσ; q
′
2 (defined by µ
′, ν ′) largest right alternative of
Player 2 for eσ;
• eρ largest edge in {ℓ1 + ℓ2 + 1, . . . , µ
′ − 1} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• q¯2, defined by µ¯ and ν¯, smallest left alternative of Player 2 for eρ;
• µ′ ≤ ν¯ ≤ σ − 1;
see Figure 65 for illustration. This leads to contradictions for all possible types of NBCs.
52
s1
s2
t1
t2
µ¯
β
ρ µ′ ν¯ σ µ α
e
γ
ν
ν ′
q2
q¯2
q′2
q1
Figure 65: PBC6, q1 big
Proof. We get the following contradictions:
Type of NBC contradiction
1, 3a-c, 4a-c, 6, 10 not possible since q1 is big
2, 3f, 3g, 4d, 4e cheaper Steiner forest (q1 and tight alternative for Player 2)
3d, 3e, 4f, 4g, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11 e is completely paid
For NBC12, we do not get a contradiction directly. We only get that there is an edge in
{µ′, . . . , ν¯} that is not completely paid by Player 1. Let eτ be the largest such edge. The
situation is illustrated in Figure 66.
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Figure 66: NBC12 in Lemma 16
We now change the cost shares for this case iteratively. First, Player 1/2 in/decreases her cost
share on eτ and de/increases on eρ (by a suitably small amount to ensure that no alternatives get
tight). This is obviously feasible for both Players because of the choice of q1 and q¯2. But after
that, q′2 is not tight anymore (according to the changed cost shares). If there is no tight right
alternative left which substitutes eσ , Player 2 can increase her cost share on this edge, while
Player 1 decreases it and then Player 1 can increase on e, which is a contradiction. Otherwise,
redefine q′2 as the largest right alternative according to the changed cost shares. It is clear
that µ′ ≥ τ + 1 has to hold, otherwise q′2 could not be tight now. If µ
′ ≤ ν¯ holds, we get a
contradiction: Our choice of τ implies that Player 1 pays the edges eµ′ , . . . , eν¯ completely. But
we can obviously repeat our arguments above and get (by NBC12) that there has to be an edge
in eµ′ , . . . , eν¯ that is not completely paid by Player 1. Therefore µ′ ≥ ν¯ + 1 has to hold. If
µ′ = ν¯ + 1 or Player 2 pays the edges eν¯+1, . . . , eµ′−1, we can construct a cheaper Steiner forest
by using q1, q¯2 and q′2. Thus redefine eρ as the largest edge in {ν¯ + 1, . . . , µ
′ − 1} that is not
completely paid by Player 2. If Player 2 has no tight alternative for this edge, she can increase
her cost share on this edge, while Player 1 decreases it and additionally increases on e, which is
a contradiction. Therefore there has to be a left alternative for eρ (note that there can not be a
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right one) and we redefine q¯2 as the smallest such alternative. Analogously as above, there is an
edge in {µ′, . . . , ν¯} that is not completely paid by Player 1 and we redefine eτ as the largest such
edge. Now we have reached the situation of Figure 66 again and can repeat the argumentation
until we finally get a contradiction (this obviously terminates).
Lemma 17 (PBC8). Assume that (P2, P1, q′2, q
′
1, q1) is a NBC for (u, v, w, x) = (s2, t2, s1, t1)
with the properties of PBC8, i.e.
• q1 (defined by β, γ) smallest right alternative of Player 1 for e;
• eα largest edge in {β, . . . , ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• q2 (defined by µ, ν) smallest right alternative of Player 2 for eα;
• eσ largest edge in {β, . . . , µ − 1} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• only right alternatives of Player 2 for eσ; q
′
2 (defined by µ
′, ν ′) largest right alternative of
Player 2 for eσ;
• q′2 small;
• eρ largest edge in {µ
′, . . . , β − 1} which Player 1 does not pay completely;
• q′1 (defined by β
′, γ′) smallest left alternative of Player 1 which substitutes eρ, but not eσ;
• β ≤ γ′ ≤ σ − 1;
see Figure 67 for illustration. This is only possible if the edges eβ, . . . , eγ′ all have cost 0.
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Figure 67: PBC8
Proof. The following types of NBCs yield contradictions:
Type of NBC contradiction
3d-g, 4d-g, 7, 8, 11, 12 not possible since q′2 is small
1, 3a, 4a-c, 6, 9, 10 e is completely paid
3b, 3c, 5 Player 2 pays eα
For NBC2, we do not get a contradiction directly. But we get that Player 1 pays the edges
eβ, . . . , eγ′ . If there is such an edge with cost larger than zero, let eτ be the smallest such one.
That implies that ξ1,eτ = c(eτ ) > 0. Now let us consider CHANGE(ρ, τ) and analyze why this is
not feasible: The changes for Player 1 are feasible since q′1 is the smallest alternative for Player 1
which substitutes eρ, but not eσ. Therefore the changes can not be feasible for Player 2 and
there has to be a right alternative for Player 2 which substitutes eτ , but not eρ. But then we
can construct a cheaper Steiner forest by using this alternative together with q1, since Player 1
pays the edges eρ+1, . . . , eβ−1 and the edges eβ, . . . , eτ−1 have costs zero. Therefore the costs of
the edges eβ , . . . , eγ′ all have to be 0.
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Lemma 18 (PBC12, in the case q2 small). Assume that (P2, P1, q2, q′1, q1) is a NBC for (u, v, w, x) =
(s2, t2, s1, t1) with the properties of PBC12 and q2 small, i.e.
• q1 (defined by β, γ) smallest right alternative of Player 1 for e;
• eα largest edge in {β, . . . , ℓ1 + ℓ2 +m} which Player 2 does not pay completely;
• q2 (defined by µ, ν) smallest right alternative of Player 2 for eα;
• eσ largest edge in {µ, . . . , β − 1} which Player 1 does not pay completely;
• q2 small;
• q′1 (defined by β
′, γ′) smallest left alternative of Player 1 which substitutes eσ, but not eα;
• β ≤ γ′ ≤ α− 1;
see Figure 68 for illustration. This leads to contradictions for all possible types of NBCs.
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Figure 68: PBC12, q2 small
Proof. The following types of NBCs yield contradictions:
Type of NBC contradiction
3d-g, 4d-g, 7, 8, 11, 12 not possible since q2 is small
1, 3a, 4a-c, 6, 9, 10 e is completely paid
3b, 3c, 5 Player 2 pays eα
For NBC2, we do not get a contradiction directly. But we get that Player 1 has a tight alternative
q¯1 which substitutes e and all commonly used edges and is also a left alternative. Let q′2 (defined
by µ′ and ν ′) be the largest right alternative for Player 2. Now if q′2 substitutes all commonly
used edges or Player 2 pays the edges eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eµ′−1, we get a cheaper Steiner forest by
using q¯1 and q′2. Thus let eτ be the largest such edge which Player 2 does not pay completely.
Since the cost shares are maximized for Player 2, she has a tight alternative which substitutes
eτ and this has to be a left alternative because of the choice of q′2. We consider a smallest left
alternative q¯2 according to τ , defined by µ¯ and ν¯. If ν¯ ≤ µ′−1 holds, we can construct a cheaper
solution by using q¯1, q′2 and q¯2 since Player 2 pays the edges eτ+1, . . . , eµ′−1 by the choice of
τ . For ν¯ ≥ α we also get a cheaper solution since Player 2 pays the edges eα+1, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2+m.
Therefore ν¯ ∈ {µ′, . . . , α− 1} has to hold. We distinguish between ν¯ ≤ σ − 1 and ν¯ ≥ σ.
For the first case, (P1, P2, q′1, q
′
2, q¯2) is a NBC for (u, v, w, x) = (t1, s1, t2, s2), see Figure 69.
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Figure 69: First case of NBC2 in Lemma 18 (µ ≤ ν¯ ≤ σ − 1 also possible)
Analyzing the different types yields the following contradictions:
Type of NBC contradiction
3d-g, 4d-g, 7, 8, 11, 12 not possible since q′1 is small
1, 5, 6 Player 1 pays eσ
2, 3b, 3c, 4a cheaper Steiner forest (q¯1 and a tight alternative for Player 2)
3a, 9, 10 Player 2 pays eα
4b cost of eτ is zero
4c Player 2 pays eτ
Therefore ν¯ ≥ σ has to hold. Since the cost shares are maximized for Player 2, the following
changes of cost shares (by a suitably small amount) cannot yield a feasible assignment, since the
sum of cost shares of Player 2 would be higher than before:
Player 2 increases on eα and eτ and decreases on eσ,
Player 1 increases on eσ and decreases on eα and eτ .
It is clear that Player 1 can increase on eσ and decrease on eα and eτ since every alternative
that substitutes eσ also substitutes eα or eτ . But the changes are also feasible for Player 2, thus
we get a contradiction: It is clear that Player 2 can decrease on eσ and increase on eτ since
q¯2 is the smallest left alternative for eτ . Additionally increasing on eα is also possible: There
can not be a right alternative which substitutes eα, but not eσ (note that q2 also substitutes
eσ); there can not be a right alternative which substitutes eτ because q′2 is the largest right
alternative and a left alternative which substitutes eα would lead to a cheaper Steiner forest
(together with q¯1). Overall this shows that a NBC2 in the original situation of this lemma also
yields a contradiction.
Lemma 19. In the Subcases PBC2, PBC3, PBC4, PBC5, PBC6 (in the case that q1 is small),
PBC7, PBC9, PBC10, PBC11, PBC12 (in the case that q2 is big), PBC13 and PBC14 we get
contradictions for all possible types of NBCs.
The proofs of these cases are left to the reader, where one has to use the properties discussed in
the proof of Proposition 5 to get contradictions to the properties for all possible types of NBCs
discussed in Lemma 3 to Lemma 14. These proofs are similar to the proofs of Lemma 15 to
Lemma 18.
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A.2.5. Procedure for computing PL-cost shares
Algorithm 2: PushLeft
Data: Steiner forest F and an optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈{1,2},e∈Pi for (LP(F )).
Result: Transformed optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈{1,2},e∈Pi for (LP(F )).
1 Choose one player, w.l.o.g. Player 1.
2 Let P1 = e1, . . . , eℓ1 , eℓ1+ℓ2+1, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2+m+r1 the (directed) path of Player 1 in F from her
source s1 to her sink t1 and A1 the ordered set of indices of edges in P1.
3 if P1 ∩ P2 6= ∅ then
4 if considering P2 as directed from s2 to t2 induces the opposite direction on P1 ∩ P2
(compared to the direction of P1) then
5 swap s2 and t2
6 end
7 Let P2 = eℓ1+1, . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2+m, eℓ1+ℓ2+m+r1+1 . . . , eℓ1+ℓ2+m+r1+r2 the (directed) path of
Player 2 in F from her source s2 to her sink t2 and A2 the ordered set of indices of
edges in P2.
8 end
9 change ← true
10 while change = true do
11 change ← false
12 for i = 1, 2 do
13 for α ∈ Ai do
14 Eα ← {eδ : δ ∈ Ai, δ ≤ α}
15 solve
max σi,eα
s.t.
∑
e∈Eα
σi,e =
∑
e∈Eα
ξi,e∑
j∈N\i
ξj,e + σi,e ≤ c(e) ∀e ∈ Eα
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i\Eα
ξi,e +
∑
e∈(Pi\P ′i )∩Eα
σi,e ≤
∑
e∈P ′i\Pi
c(e) ∀P ′i ∈ Pi
σi,e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Eα
16 if σi,eα 6= ξi,eα then
17 change ← true
18 end
19 for e ∈ Eα do
20 ξi,e ← σi,e
21 end
22 end
23 end
24 end
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